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ABSTRACT—Using only a series of images of a person’s face and publicly
available software, it is now possible to insert the person’s likeness into a
video and show them saying or doing almost anything. This “deepfake”
technology has permitted an explosion of political satire and, especially, fake
pornography. Several states have already passed laws regulating deepfakes,
and more are poised to do so. This Article presents three novel empirical
studies that assess public attitudes toward this new technology. In our main
study, a representative sample of the U.S. adult population perceived
nonconsensually created pornographic deepfake videos as extremely
harmful and overwhelmingly wanted to impose criminal sanctions on those
creating them. Labeling pornographic deepfakes as fictional did not mitigate
the videos’ perceived wrongfulness. In contrast, participants considered
nonpornographic deepfakes substantially less wrongful when they were
labeled as fictional or did not depict inherently defamatory conduct (such as
illegal drug use). A follow-up study showed that people sought to impose
both civil and criminal liability on deepfake creation. A second follow-up
showed that people judge the creation and dissemination of deepfake
pornography to be as harmful as the dissemination of traditional
nonconsensual pornography—otherwise known as revenge pornography—
and to be slightly more morally blameworthy.
Based on the types of harms perceived in these studies, we argue that
prohibitions on deepfake pornographic videos should receive the same
treatment under the First Amendment as prohibitions on traditional
nonconsensual pornography rather than being dealt with under the lessprotective law of defamation. In contrast, nonpornographic deepfakes can
likely only be dealt with via defamation law. Still, there may be reason to
allow for enhanced penalties or other regulations based on the greater harm
people perceive from a defamatory deepfake than a defamatory written story.
AUTHORS—Matthew B. Kugler is an Associate Professor at Northwestern
Pritzker School of Law. Carly Pace is a J.D. Candidate at Northwestern
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INTRODUCTION
In 2020, actress Kristen Bell was shocked to discover a pornographic
video of herself online. The reason Bell was so surprised was that she had
never filmed the video. In an interview with Vox, Bell stated, “We’re having
this gigantic conversation about consent, and I don’t consent, so that’s why
it’s not okay . . . even if it’s labeled as, ‘This is not actually her,’ it’s hard to
612
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think about that.”1 The video was what is known as a “deepfake.” Deepfakes
are videos that use machine-learning algorithms to digitally impose one
person’s face and voice onto videos of other people.2 The resulting doctored
videos show people doing and saying things they never did or said. The
number of videos like the one Kristen Bell found of herself is increasing.
From July 2019 to June 2020, there was an increase of over 330% in the
number of deepfake videos found online.3 And the deepfake of Bell is a
typical example of the genre. Ninety-six percent of all deepfake videos
online are pornographic, and those depicted in pornographic deepfakes are
almost exclusively women.4 Nonpornographic deepfake videos have
depicted politicians, corporate figures, and celebrities.5
As the opening example of Bell illustrates, many deepfake subjects feel
harmed by their depictions in these false videos. The emerging scholarly
literature on deepfakes discusses them causing two types of harm: dignitary
harms to the individuals depicted in the videos (whether viewers believe the
videos or not)6 and political and national security harms to society from
successfully deceptive videos.7 Yet the literature has noted that there are few
legal protections for deepfake subjects under traditional privacy law, and
what law does exist⎯for example, the law of defamation⎯tends to target

1 Cleo Abram, The Most Urgent Threat of Deepfakes Isn’t Politics. It’s Porn., VOX: RECODE (June
8, 2020), https://www.vox.com/2020/6/8/21284005/urgent-threat-deepfakes-politics-porn-kristen-bell
[https://perma.cc/2MTD-6XHN].
2 Bobby Chesney & Danielle Citron, Deep Fakes: A Looming Challenge for Privacy, Democracy,
and National Security, 107 CALIF. L. REV. 1753, 1758 (2019).
3 Henry Ajder, Deepfake Threat Intelligence: A Statistics Snapshot from June 2020, SENSITY (July
3, 2020), https://sensity.ai/deepfake-threat-intelligence-a-statistics-snapshot-from-june-2020/ [https://
perma.cc/ZHW5-53U7]; see also HENRY AJDER, GIORGIO PATRINI, FRANCESCO CAVALLI & LAURENCE
CULLEN, DEEPTRACE, THE STATE OF DEEPFAKES: LANDSCAPE, THREATS, AND IMPACT 1 (2019)
[hereinafter DEEPTRACE] (reviewing the current landscape and describing the rise over the last several
years).
4 DEEPTRACE, supra note 3, at 1–2. Although one study found that 100% of pornographic deepfake
videos targeted women, see id. at 2, there are some pornographic deepfake videos of male celebrities,
though these male videos are comparatively rare. Such videos do exist, however. MrDeepFakes.com has
a small “Gay” section that features male celebrities such as Chris Pratt, Chris Evans, and Tom Holland.
Notably, the category has only ninety-five videos as of June 2021, whereas many of the other categories
have three- or four-digit video counts.
5 Id. at 2.
6 See, e.g., Danielle Keats Citron, Sexual Privacy, 128 YALE L.J. 1870, 1886, 1925 (2019)
(describing human dignity as encompassing the ability to manage access to one’s “naked body and
intimate information”).
7 See, e.g., Chesney & Citron, supra note 2, at 1783–84 (“[D]eep fakes have utility as a form of
disinformation supporting strategic, operational, or even tactical deception.”).
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only deception-related harms and not dignitary violations.8 The general
problem is that the major privacy torts target those who obtain or publicize
information that is both true and private. These torts are a poor match for the
typical case of pornographic deepfakes, where that which is true (the
person’s face) is not private, and that which is private (the sex act) is not
true.9
Given that existing laws tend not to cover deepfake videos, several
states have moved to create new regulations to address them. In 2019,
California passed two measures: one creating a civil cause of action for those
featured in pornographic deepfakes and the other prohibiting the
dissemination of unlabeled altered videos containing political candidates in
the weeks leading up to an election.10 Similarly, Virginia expanded its
nonconsensual-pornography statute to cover morphed videos,11 and Texas
protected candidates in the lead-up to elections.12 Notably, one Texas
candidate has already attempted to avail himself of that law’s protection.13
New York has recently passed new legislation expanding its nonconsensualpornography law and providing limited protection against commercial uses
of deepfakes.14 Many other states, as well as the federal government, have
also considered action in recent months.15 As nonconsensual-pornography

8

See, e.g., id. at 1793–94 (discussing defamation as a remedy); Kareem Gibson, Note, Deepfakes
and Involuntary Pornography: Can Our Current Legal Framework Address This Technology?,
66 WAYNE L. REV. 259, 272–282 (2020) (discussing the limitations of various tort actions as a remedy);
Russell Spivak, “Deepfakes”: The Newest Way to Commit One of the Oldest Crimes, 3 GEO. L. TECH.
REV. 339, 368–83 (2019) (analyzing the viability of various tort actions); Rebecca A. Delfino,
Pornographic Deepfakes: The Case for Federal Criminalization of Revenge Porn’s Next Tragic Act,
88 FORDHAM L. REV. 887, 918–21 (2019) (discussing the inadequacy of current criminal laws in
addressing deepfakes).
9 See Citron, supra note 6, at 1939.
10 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1708.86 (West 2020) (creating a civil cause of action for those nonconsensually
depicted in altered videos that show them engaging in sexually explicit conduct); CAL. ELEC. CODE
§ 20010 (West 2020) (prohibiting unlabeled, altered videos featuring political candidates in the weeks
prior to an election).
11 VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-386.2 (West 2019).
12 TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. § 255.004(d) (West 2019).
13 Jasper Scherer, Sylvester Turner Calls for Investigation into Tony Buzbee Ad, Citing ‘Deep Fake’
Law, HOUS. CHRON. (Oct. 18, 2019, 8:44 PM), https://www.houstonchronicle.com/news/houston-texas/
houston/article/Sylvester-Turner-calls-for-investigation-into-14545665.php
[https://perma.cc/42XXV49Q] (“Mayor Sylvester Turner has called for the district attorney to open a criminal investigation into
Tony Buzbee’s campaign over a television ad that appears to show edited photos of Turner and an
allegedly fake text between the mayor and a 31-year-old intern who works at the airport.”).
14 N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW §§ 50-F, 52-C (McKinney 2021).
15 See, e.g., David Ruiz, Deepfakes Laws and Proposals Flood US, MALWAREBYTES LABS (Jan. 23,
2020),
https://blog.malwarebytes.com/artificial-intelligence/2020/01/deepfakes-laws-and-proposalsflood-us/ [https://perma.cc/ZE73-DV8A] (describing current legislative efforts).
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laws proliferated greatly over the 2010s,16 deepfake laws seem poised to
expand in the 2020s.
Yet deepfakes present a difficult and novel challenge for courts and
lawmakers. They raise fundamental questions about the moral wrongfulness
of new and unusual technological acts that may harm others. How wrong is
it to use a publicly available photo of a person’s face? Is it problematic to
make a deepfake that is pornographic? What about one that is not? Is it still
harmful if people know the deepfake is fake? Currently, there is very little
data on how the public views deepfakes and, particularly, how the public
may view different types of deepfakes.
This lack of understanding of public attitudes is a substantial problem.
Legal scholars have argued that laws⎯especially criminal laws⎯should
reflect the views of the society that they govern.17 Prior research has shown
that both over- and under-criminalization can substantially degrade the law’s
legitimacy in the eyes of the public and reduce public compliance with legal
rules.18 People reading news reports of unjust laws express a greater
willingness to engage in illegal activities,19 they exhibit a greater inclination
toward jury nullification in mock-juror studies,20 and they are even more
likely to cheat on experimental tasks and to steal pens.21 There are, therefore,
high costs to what some authors have called “disillusionment” with the law.22
If we do not know how the public views the moral wrongfulness of deepfake
production, then we cannot pass laws conforming to those beliefs.
Public perceptions also play a substantial role in parts of privacy law,
further strengthening the case for researching deepfake attitudes. The
language of several privacy and privacy-related causes of action explicitly
references the attitudes of the community or the reasonable person. Two of
the core privacy torts⎯intrusion upon seclusion and public disclosure of
private facts⎯require that the privacy invasions or information disclosures
16 See generally Mary Anne Franks, “Revenge Porn” Reform: A View from the Front Lines, 69 FLA.
L. REV. 1251 (2017) (reviewing the rapid expansion of nonconsensual-pornography laws from 2013 to
2017).
17 See, e.g., Tom R. Tyler & John M. Darley, Building a Law-Abiding Society: Taking Public Views
About Morality and the Legitimacy of Legal Authorities into Account When Formulating Substantive
Law, 28 HOFSTRA L. REV. 707, 719–22 (2000) (“To sustain its moral authority, the law must be
experienced as consistent with people’s sense of morality.”).
18 See Janice Nadler, Flouting the Law, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1399, 1415–16 (2005); Paul H. Robinson,
Geoffrey P. Goodwin & Michael D. Reisig, The Disutility of Injustice, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1940, 2005−06
(2010).
19 Nadler, supra note 18, at 1415–16.
20 Id. at 1424–25.
21 Elizabeth Mullen & Janice Nadler, Moral Spillovers: The Effect of Moral Violations on Deviant
Behavior, 44 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCH. 1239, 1239−45 (2008).
22 Robinson et al., supra note 18, at 2005.
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be “highly offensive to a reasonable person.”23 Public perceptions are
similarly critical for understanding obscenity, which is often at issue in cases
involving sexual content. The meaning of obscenity depends on “community
standards,” particularly in determining what is “patently offensive” within a
community.24 Everyday people often resolve these questions, embodying the
judgment of their communities, via the jury system,25 and previous empirical
research has examined the degree of correspondence between actual
community attitudes and jury decisions in obscenity cases.26 The jury is used
in a similar fashion to embody the community’s views in defamation actions,
in which the jury determines whether a given statement about a person would
harm their reputation either in general or in the eyes of some relevant subset
of their peers.27
Outside the privacy tort context, many scholars have advocated using
public opinion data to inform the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableexpectations-of-privacy analysis.28 Professors Christopher Slobogin and
Joseph Schumacher pioneered this method by having respondents rate the
intrusiveness of a variety of law enforcement information-gathering

23

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 652B, 652D (AM. L. INST. 1977).
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23–24 (1973); Daniel Linz, Edward Donnerstein, Kenneth C.
Land, Patricia L. McCall, Joseph Scott, Bradley J. Shafer, Lee J. Klein & Larry Lance, Estimating
Community Standards: The Use of Social Science Evidence in an Obscenity Prosecution, 55 PUB. OP. Q.
80, 82 (1991).
25 This issue is not generally a matter for expert testimony. See, e.g., St. John v. N.C. Parole Comm’n,
764 F. Supp. 403, 408–10 (W.D.N.C. 1991) (citing cases that establish that expert testimony need not be
introduced in obscenity cases). Instead, the jury is expected to fulfill this role. See, e.g., Piepenburg v.
Cutler, 649 F.2d 783, 792 (10th Cir. 1981) (noting that “when the material itself is introduced into
evidence, the jury may judge for itself, using its own sense of community standards, whether the material
is obscene; that is, the jury brings to the trial the community standard and no evidence is necessary to
establish it”).
26 See Linz et al., supra note 24, at 80–82; see also Daniel Linz, Kenneth C. Land, Bradley J. Shafer,
Arthur C. Graesser, Edward Donnerstein & Patricia L. McCall, Discrepancies Between the Legal Code
and Community Standards for Sex and Violence: An Empirical Challenge to Traditional Assumptions in
Obscenity Law, 29 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 127, 134 (1995) (discussing the “prosecution-induced
intolerance” phenomenon, whereby jurors may assume that the community is less tolerant to sexually
explicit material because of law enforcement’s intolerance towards those materials).
27 See, e.g., Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Defamation, Reputation, and the Myth of Community, 71 WASH.
L. REV. 1, 6−8 (1996) (expressing skepticism about this idea of a community while at the same time
recognizing its ubiquity in the doctrinal discussion). A defendant in a defamation case may also seek to
show that a plaintiff is a public figure⎯which changes the required mens rea⎯and one way of doing that
is surveying the local community to determine their level of recognition. Waldbaum v. Fairchild Publ’ns,
Inc., 627 F.2d 1287, 1295 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (“The judge can examine statistical surveys, if presented, that
concern the plaintiff’s name recognition.”).
28 For an extensive discussion justifying the use of such data, see Matthew B. Kugler & Lior Jacob
Strahilevitz, Actual Expectations of Privacy, Fourth Amendment Doctrine, and the Mosaic Theory,
2015 SUP. CT. REV. 205, 224–44 (2016).
24
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techniques.29 Similarly, Professors Christine Scott-Hayward, Henry F.
Fradella, and Ryan G. Fischer and Professors Bernard Chao, Ian Farrell,
Christopher Robertson, and Ms. Catherine Durso have investigated
Americans’ opinions and beliefs about forms of electronic surveillance,
finding, for example, that people generally expect privacy in data, such as
their cell phone location records.30
There is therefore a rich tradition of considering the public’s views both
when setting the boundaries of criminal laws and when considering the scope
of a person’s privacy rights in civil actions. And there is some danger in
setting policy in this area absent a better understanding of how people
actually view deepfake videos. Yet, to date, the authors are aware of no other
study that examines public opinion on different kinds of deepfakes. Two
questions, in particular, are left unanswered. First, do people view deepfakes
as wrongful even if they are labeled as fake (and thus are not deceptive)?
Second, are nonpornographic deepfakes harmful if they do not depict
defamatory conduct?
These questions are especially important given the First Amendment
challenges of deepfake regulation. The government cannot prohibit speech
merely because the speech is false; there must be some additional problem.31
Given that mere falsity is not enough, we look to two potential frameworks
that would allow for regulation for deepfakes. One is a defamation-style
framework. This approach would allow for the prohibition of deepfakes that
(1) are false, (2) are intended for viewers to perceive as true, and (3) cause
harm to the target’s reputation or standing in the community.32 In such a
framework, labeling the deepfake as fake would remove all liability; it would
negate the second element. If people view labeled deepfakes as harmless,
then they are implicitly taking this defamation-style approach.
Alternatively, one could take a privacy-violation approach to deepfake
regulation. Drawing a parallel to the existing law of nonconsensual
pornography, this approach would view the harm as coming from the
29

Christopher Slobogin & Joseph E. Schumacher, Reasonable Expectations of Privacy and
Autonomy in Fourth Amendment Cases: An Empirical Look at “Understandings Recognized and
Permitted by Society,” 42 DUKE L.J. 727, 737 (1993); CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, PRIVACY AT RISK: THE
NEW GOVERNMENT SURVEILLANCE AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 110–11 (2007); see also Jeremy A.
Blumenthal, Meera Adya & Jacqueline Mogle, The Multiple Dimensions of Privacy: Testing Lay
“Expectations of Privacy,” 11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 331, 343–45 (2009) (replicating Slobogin and
Schumacher’s main results).
30 Christine S. Scott-Hayward, Henry F. Fradella & Ryan G. Fischer, Does Privacy Require Secrecy?
Societal Expectations of Privacy in the Digital Age, 43 AM. J. CRIM. L. 19, 45–58 (2015); Bernard Chao,
Catherine Durso, Ian Farrell & Christopher Robertson, Why Courts Fail to Protect Privacy: Race, Age,
Bias, and Technology, 106 CALIF. L. REV. 263, 301 (2018).
31 See infra notes 228−233 and accompanying text.
32 See infra notes 97−101 and accompanying text.
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appropriation of a person’s identity and the depiction of them in a highly
private position. Labeling the videos as fiction does not meaningfully
remove this harm; the target’s identity is still being appropriated. To the
extent that people view the creation of pornographic deepfakes as highly
harmful and this harm as not mitigated by labeling, it may be appropriate to
assimilate pornographic deepfake regulation into the broader law of
nonconsensual pornography. Though this is most likely to be an issue for
pornographic deepfakes, people may also view the appropriation of people’s
identities in the nonpornographic context as highly offensive, shedding light
on which framework is proper there as well.
This Article presents the findings from three experimental studies that
asked people to evaluate the wrongfulness of creating both pornographic and
nonpornographic deepfake videos. Part I explains the rise of deepfake
technology and the current scholarship on deepfake harms. It also reviews
the current legal status of deepfakes and how it fits into holes in existing
privacy laws. Part II introduces the three empirical studies. The primary
study explores four main domains: pornographic videos and
nonpornographic videos, either labeled fictional or unlabeled. Within both
the pornographic and nonpornographic contexts, the study examines public
reactions to a range of scenarios. This diverse set of scenarios allows us to
consider the correspondence between public attitudes and both existing and
proposed legal regimes.
This study finds that people are extremely critical of deepfakes, with
many participants seeking to criminalize all types of deepfakes. Participants
viewed deepfake videos as more wrongful and harmful than written accounts
describing the same conduct. Though people regarded the production of
nonpornographic deepfakes—which we call “attitudinal” deepfakes—as less
wrongful when the videos were clearly marked as fictional, this was not the
case for pornographic deepfakes. In fact, 92% of participants wanted to
criminalize the dissemination of a pornographic deepfake even if the label
indicated that it was fake. Pornographic deepfakes featuring celebrities (as
opposed to everyday people) or non-nude but sexualized conduct were also
all but universally condemned. These reactions do not merely reflect
common opposition to pornography in all its forms: Prior research has shown
that significantly fewer people, only about 30% of the public, want to
criminalize pornography more generally.33 In contrast, participants
considered attitudinal deepfakes substantially less wrongful if they did not
depict inherently defamatory conduct, such as illegal drug use. But many
33 Charles Fain Lehman, What Do Americans Think About Banning Porn?, INST. FOR FAM. STUD.
(Dec. 18, 2019), https://ifstudies.org/blog/what-do-americans-think-about-banning-porn [https://perma.
cc/XUP9-DBCN].
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participants still wished to assign criminal liability even for the creation of
less obviously harmful attitudinal deepfake videos, such as one depicting a
deceased scientist describing their life’s work. A smaller follow-up study in
Section II.D shows that participants generally support allowing for both civil
and criminal causes of action against those who produce deepfakes. Finally,
a second follow-up study reported in Section II.E shows that people judge
pornographic deepfakes to be on par with traditional nonconsensual
pornography. Specifically, they view the dissemination of a pornographic
deepfake to be as harmful as the dissemination of traditional nonconsensual
pornography, and they consider it marginally more morally blameworthy.
Part III considers the implications of these findings for legal reform.
Whenever society seeks to regulate a new form of misconduct, one of its first
tasks is to define what counts as wrong. Our data show that people are deeply
skeptical of the involuntary sexualization that stems from pornographic
deepfakes. They take a context-dependent view of the dignitary harms
present in attitudinal deepfakes. The current civil and criminal regimes do
not sufficiently reflect these moral intuitions. We proceed to explore whether
attempts to bring the law into greater alignment with public attitudes would
be constitutionally permissible under the First Amendment. Part III
considers both the complexities of banning speech that is merely false as well
as the kinds of harms that courts have recognized when considering cases
involving nonconsensual pornography and morphed child pornography.34
Ultimately, the fact that the harm perceived from pornographic deepfakes is
not mitigated by labeling leads us to conclude that regulation of such videos
should fall under the same First Amendment standards as regulation of
nonconsensual
pornography
generally.
The
implications
for
nonpornographic deepfakes are less clear, and it may be proper to think of
them primarily through the lens of defamation.
I.

THE RISE OF DEEPFAKES AND THEORIES OF DEEPFAKE HARMS

Producing deepfake videos has gone from being extremely difficult to
trivially easy in under five years.35 This Part reviews the rise of deepfake
technologies and then considers the kinds of societal and individual harms
that may be caused by their increasing prevalence. It closes by reviewing the
current legal status of deepfakes under various civil and criminal regimes.

34 For definitions of these terms, see infra text accompanying note 236 (nonconsensual pornography),
and infra text accompanying note 257 (morphed child pornography).
35 For one indicator of the prevalence of generative adversarial networks (GANs), described below,
see DEEPTRACE, supra note 3, at 3 (showing that a mere three academic papers mentioned GANs in their
titles or abstracts in 2014 and over one thousand did so in 2019).
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A. Deepfake Technology and the Rise of Consumer Use
Deepfake videos are generally created using generative adversarial
networks (GANs), a technology created by Ian Goodfellow in 2014.36 GAN
technology involves the use of two neural networks in a dynamic that
“mimics the back-and-forth between a picture forger and an art detective
who repeatedly try to outwit one another.”37 The first network, known as the
“generator,” creates fake outputs until the second network, known as the
“discriminator,” cannot tell the difference between the generator’s outputs
and an original data set.38 The result is a realistic-looking video. Essentially,
the technology takes an image, such as a face, learns it, and inserts it into a
video such that the substituted face appears seamlessly.
The rise of deepfake videos and consumer use of deepfake technology
started in 2017 on the website Reddit. A user named “deepfake” posted
doctored pornography that swapped the faces of celebrities and public
figures with people in pornographic videos.39 This user’s posts became
incredibly popular. A specialized Reddit page, known as a “subreddit,” was
dedicated exclusively to deepfake videos and quickly reached 90,000
community members.40
Although deepfake pornography has since been banned on Reddit,41 the
prevalence of deepfake videos on the internet is growing rapidly. One study
found that in July 2019, there were 14,678 deepfake videos online,
representing a near-100% increase from seven months earlier in December
2018.42 As of June 2020, there were 49,081 deepfake videos online,
representing an increase of over 330% in a year.43 “Since December 2018,
the number of deepfakes online is roughly doubling every six months,

36 See Martin Giles, The GANfather: The Man Who’s Given Machines the Gift of Imagination, MIT
TECH. REV. (Feb. 21, 2018), https://www.technologyreview.com/2018/02/21/145289/the-ganfather-theman-whos-given-machines-the-gift-of-imagination/ [https://perma.cc/A7EX-QXQY].
37 Id.
38 Id.
39 Meredith Somers, Deepfakes, Explained, MIT SLOAN (July 21, 2020), https://mitsloan.mit.edu/
ideas-made-to-matter/deepfakes-explained [https://perma.cc/8U6Y-QCCH]; Deepfakes, KNOW YOUR
MEME, https://knowyourmeme.com/memes/cultures/deepfakes [https://perma.cc/WMU2-YZR4].
40 Mika Westerlund, The Emergence of Deepfake Technology: A Review, 9 TECH. INNOVATION
MGMT. REV. 39, 41 (2019).
41 Adi Robertson, Reddit Bans ‘Deepfakes’ AI Porn Communities, VERGE (Feb. 7, 2018, 1:28
PM),
https://www.theverge.com/2018/2/7/16982046/reddit-deepfakes-ai-celebrity-face-swap-porncommunity-ban [https://perma.cc/4CMF-A9ZN]; Arjun Kharpal, Reddit, Pornhub Ban Videos that Use
A.I. to Superimpose a Person’s Face over an X-Rated Actor, CNBC (Feb. 8, 2018, 6:44 AM),
https://www.cnbc.com/2018/02/08/reddit-pornhub-ban-deepfake-porn-videos.html
[https://perma.cc/
HM9W-5U5H].
42 DEEPTRACE, supra note 3, at 1, 16.
43 Ajder, supra note 3.
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confirming a continued exponential growth.”44 While this increase in the
prevalence of deepfake videos can be attributed to consumer access to
deepfake technology, it may also be attributed to its media coverage in recent
years. Indeed, the media has often had the effect of popularizing dark corners
of the internet. Take, for example, the case of Silk Road, the online
marketplace that operated as a black market for guns, drugs, and other illicit
goods and services.45 Eventually, a journalist at Gawker discovered the
website and published an article about it.46 Within days, discussion of the
website became part of the national discourse, customers flocked to the site,
and the previously unknown website caught the attention of Congress and
the Department of Justice.47
Some uses of deepfake technology have become mainstream. A simple
Google search yields not only deepfake videos themselves, which are widely
available on the internet, but also consumer access to the technology used to
create these videos.48 Independent phone applications can be downloaded to
cell phones, where users can insert photos to create lifelike videos. Social
media applications Snapchat and TikTok have integrated deepfake
technology into their platforms as well.49 For example, in December 2019,
Snapchat announced a new tool called “Cameos,” which allows users to
insert their own pictures into a video setting to create a deepfake video.50
However, these features generally limit what users can do with the deepfake
technology. For example, the Cameos feature allows users to “jump into”
preset scenes and customize captions.51 These are generally intended to be
fun or silly. One tutorial on Cameos shows how people can be inserted into
44

Id.
Caroline Sommers & Emily Bernstein, Inside the FBI Takedown of the Mastermind Behind
Website Offering Drugs, Guns and Murders for Hire, CBS NEWS (Nov. 10, 2020, 11:03 PM),
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/ross-ulbricht-dread-pirate-roberts-silk-road-fbi/
[https://perma.cc/VD9M-DNZF].
46 NICK BILTON, AMERICAN KINGPIN: THE EPIC HUNT FOR THE CRIMINAL MASTERMIND BEHIND
THE SILK ROAD 53 (2017).
47 Id. at 56–58.
48 Some of the top results from a Google search of “deepfake apps” in the summer of 2021 include
Anya Zhukova, 7 Best Deepfake Apps and Websites, ONLINE TECH TIPS (Aug. 24, 2020), https://
www.online-tech-tips.com/cool-websites/7-best-deepfake-apps-and-websites/ [https://perma.cc/3X79BY2D], and Beebom Staff, 10 Best Deepfake Apps and Websites You Can Try for Fun, BEEBOM (Dec.
29, 2020), https://beebom.com/best-deepfake-apps-websites/ [https://perma.cc/SHC8-Y6DH].
49 Michael Nuñez, Snapchat and TikTok Embrace ‘Deepfake’ Video Technology Even as Facebook
Shuns It, FORBES (Jan. 8, 2020, 6:30 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/mnunez/2020/01/08/snapchatand-tiktok-embrace-deepfake-video-technology-even-as-facebook-shuns-it/#3c01b4542c05
[https://
perma.cc/JNL4-E7ZJ].
50 Introducing Cameos, SNAP INC. (Dec. 9, 2019, 2:00 AM), https://newsroom.snap.com/
introducing-cameos/ [https://perma.cc/FGB2-3L6X].
51 Id.
45
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videos showing them doing extreme sports, wearing a cat costume, or
dressed as a Wicked Witch.52
Despite the growth of silly deepfakes through some more common
applications, the overwhelming majority of deepfake videos on the internet
are pornographic.53 The majority of these deepfake videos are found on
websites dedicated solely to deepfake pornography,54 although deepfake
videos are found on mainstream pornography websites as well.55 One study
found that 100% of these videos feature female subjects and that the majority
depict famous women, such as actresses, musicians, and political figures,56
but there are now pornographic deepfake videos that depict men as well.57
Creators of pornographic deepfakes appear to be predominantly male, and
pornographic deepfakes are sometimes used as a form of targeted harassment
against women.58 The use of deepfakes as a tool for harassment may explain
why so many female political figures are the subjects of deepfakes.
In the nonpornographic context, the majority of deepfake videos depict
famous people, such as those in the entertainment industry, politicians, and
CEOs.59 Often these nonpornographic deepfakes are intended to be
satirical.60 Unlike in the pornographic context, where the purpose of the
video requires that the video appear realistic, the fact that a nonpornographic
video is a deepfake can add to the joke. An oft-cited YouTube video of Bill
Hader exemplifies the nature of these videos. The video shows a clip of
Hader on the Late Show with David Letterman in 2008. Known for his
celebrity impressions, Hader gives impressions of Tom Cruise and Seth
Rogan, and each time he gives an impression, his face morphs into the face
of the person he is impersonating.61 The video, posted by YouTuber Ctrl Shift
52 Techboomers, How to Use Snapchat Cameos - New Feature!, YOUTUBE (Jan. 14, 2020),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G11SL3azf6A [https://perma.cc/RM93-JGC2].
53 DEEPTRACE, supra note 3, at 1.
54 Id. at 6.
55 Id.; Matt Burgess, Porn Sites Still Won’t Take Down Nonconsensual Deepfakes, WIRED (Aug. 30,
2020, 9:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/porn-sites-still-wont-take-down-non-consensualdeepfakes/ [https://perma.cc/6ACE-PP87] (reporting that deepfake videos have been viewed millions of
times, including on pornography sites that “rank in the top 10 biggest sites across the entire web”).
56 DEEPTRACE, supra note 3, at 2.
57 See supra note 4.
58 Sophie Compton, More and More Women Are Facing the Scary Reality of Deepfakes, VOGUE
(Mar. 16, 2021), https://www.vogue.com/article/scary-reality-of-deepfakes-online-abuse [https://
perma.cc/LN6R-ESAB]; see also Mary Anne Franks & Ari Ezra Waldman, Sex, Lies, and Videotape:
Deep Fakes and Free Speech Delusions, 78 MD. L. REV. 892, 896–97 (2019) (commenting on the
harassment possibilities of deepfakes).
59 DEEPTRACE, supra note 3, at 2.
60 Id. at 12.
61 Ctrl Shift Face, Bill Hader Channels Tom Cruise [DeepFake], YOUTUBE (Aug. 6, 2019),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VWrhRBb-1Ig&t=50s [https://perma.cc/FL6K-FBGT].
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Face, has over eleven million views, and the title of the video labels it as a
“[DeepFake],” meaning it is clearly labeled as fictional.62
Though most deepfake videos are of public figures, private individuals
are also sometimes targeted. Social media gives deepfake producers access
to images of private individuals in a way that was traditionally only true for
celebrities.63 This store of photos, coupled with the rise of consumer access
to deepfake technology, makes the process of making deepfake videos of
private individuals straightforward. There have already been a few cases of
deepfake-facilitated harassment of private figures,64 and nonconsensual
deepfake pornography of private individuals is increasingly common.65 Of
course, people may create or consensually appear in deepfake videos in
apparently innocuous contexts, such as through social media applications. In
a relatively harmless case, a fifty-year-old man deepfaked himself as a young
woman to increase the popularity of his video channel about motorbikes.66
B. Harms
The rising number of deepfake videos online has led to increased
interest in the potential negative effects on deepfake subjects and society at
large. The new scholarship on deepfakes has generally focused on two
categories of harm associated with deepfake videos: individual harms to a
deepfake subject’s dignity and emotional well-being, and wider societal
harms involving threats to national security and democratic institutions.
Scholars have also sometimes discussed the macro-level implications of
deepfakes and their contribution to the spread of misinformation.

62

Id.
Abram, supra note 1.
64 See, e.g., Jana Benscoter, Pa. Woman Created ‘Deepfake’ Videos to Force Rivals off Daughter’s
Cheerleading Squad: Police, PA. REAL-TIME NEWS (Mar. 12, 2021), https://www.pennlive.com/news/
2021/03/pa-woman-created-deepfake-videos-to-force-rivals-off-daughters-cheerleading-squad-police.
html [https://perma.cc/CGE2-R347] (“Police arrested a 50-year-old Bucks County woman March 4 for
sending her teen daughter’s cheerleading coaches fake photos . . . [of] her rivals . . . to try to get them
kicked off the squad . . . .”).
65 See, e.g., Giorgio Patrini, Automating Image Abuse: Deepfake Bots on Telegram, SENSITY (Oct.
20, 2020), https://sensity.ai/automating-image-abuse-deepfake-bots-on-telegram/ [https://perma.cc/
B6WS-C84U] (reporting that, as of July 2020, a bot had “stripped” photos of over 100,000 women, which
were then shared publicly); Matt Burgess, Telegram Still Hasn’t Removed an AI Bot That’s Abusing
Women, WIRED (Nov. 18, 2020), https://www.wired.com/story/telegram-still-hasnt-removed-an-ai-botthats-abusing-women/ [https://perma.cc/8TSM-4PTH] (“Messaging app Telegram is under pressure to
crack down on an AI bot that has generated tens of thousands of non-consensual images of women on its
platform.”).
66 Tony Tran, Young Female Twitter Star Turns Out to Be 50-Year-Old Man Using Deepfakes,
FUTURISM: THE BYTE (Mar. 21, 2021), https://futurism.com/the-byte/young-female-twitter-star-turnsout-50-year-old-man-using-deepfakes [https://perma.cc/T28L-7S8P].
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1. Individual Harms
The potential for deepfakes to cause dignitary harms to deepfake
subjects has almost exclusively been explored in the context of
nonconsensual deepfake pornography.67 These individual harms include both
the harms associated with the video itself as well as the downstream
emotional and reputational harm stemming from subsequent uses of the
video and society’s response to the person depicted. On the harms associated
with the video itself, Professors Bobby Chesney and Danielle Citron
highlight the intangible damage caused by the videos, which can “exploit an
individual’s sexual identity for other’s gratification.”68
As with other forms of nonconsensual pornography, nonconsensual
deepfake pornography directly affects the sexual autonomy of the subjects it
depicts. Citron notes that “[s]exual privacy concerns the social norms
governing the management of boundaries around intimate life” and
“involves the extent to which others have access to and information about
people’s naked bodies (notably the parts of the body associated with sex and
gender); their sexual desires, fantasies, and thoughts; communications
related to their sex, sexuality, and gender; and intimate activities (including,
but not limited, to sexual intercourse).”69 Although deepfakes do not depict
the naked bodies of the deepfake subject⎯only the subject’s face is
taken⎯they still impinge on sexual autonomy by repurposing the subject’s
identity.
The core issue of nonconsensual pornography is consent, and deepfake
pornography adds an additional layer because the individual depicted did not
actually engage in the sexual behavior she is depicted as doing. Like the
nonconsensual disclosure of pornography that depicts an individual
engaging in activities they actually did, nonconsensual deepfake
pornography is “an affront to the sense that people’s intimate identities are
their own to share or to keep to themselves.”70
Sexual-privacy invasions can have profound effects. Victims report
experiencing significant psychological impacts such as anxiety, depression,

67

E.g., Chesney & Citron, supra note 2, at 1772–75 (exploring the emotional consequences of
sexually exploitative deepfakes but focusing on the practical and monetary harms of other deepfakes);
see also, e.g., Nina I. Brown, Deepfakes and the Weaponization of Disinformation, 23 VA. J.L. & TECH.
1, 9 (2020) (noting that potential abuses of nonpornographic deepfakes could include depicting a president
in such a way that interferes with an election or causes mass panic, but making no mention of the dignitary
harms the individuals depicted could experience).
68 Chesney & Citron, supra note 2, at 1772.
69 Citron, supra note 6, at 1880.
70 Id. at 1921.
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loss of appetite, and suicidal ideation.71 Although these impacts have not
been widely studied, qualitative research on the psychological effects of
nonconsensual pornography generally is consistent with these accounts and
underscores their potential severity.72 Further, victims of nonconsensual
pornography experience harms in the form of societal reactions. For
example, victims of nonconsensual pornography have reported experiencing
job loss and barriers to employment as a result of appearing in these videos.73
These secondary harms also exist in the deepfake context. In addition to the
psychological impact caused by the creation of nonconsensual deepfake
pornography, it has been used to threaten and harass victims.74
As Citron notes, “[w]hen the nude images of women and sexual
minorities are posted online without consent, these individuals may be
stigmatized.”75 This may be true even in the deepfake context, in which the
images do not depict the actual bodies of the subjects, and the question
remains whether labeling a deepfake video as fake ameliorates the harm to
deepfake pornography victims. Public opinion data can shed light on the
attitudes of everyday people toward these videos, and it can capture the
reactions people have to videos even when they are labeled as fake. In
Section II.E we explicitly contrast views toward deepfake pornography with
views toward traditional nonconsensual pornography.
There does not appear to be any writing on the individual dignitary
harms associated with nonpornographic deepfakes. Nevertheless, it is easy
to imagine having a visceral negative reaction to seeing oneself depicted
saying a string of racial slurs, endorsing a terrorist group, or doing cocaine
when one has not done so, for instance, and such videos could also cause
downstream effects on employability. We seek to fill this gap in the literature
by exploring views of different types of nonpornographic deepfakes in Part
II.

71 Id. at 1926; see also Sophia Ankel, Many Revenge Porn Victims Consider Suicide—Why Aren’t
Schools Doing More to Stop It?, GUARDIAN (May 7, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/lifeandstyle/
2018/may/07/many-revenge-porn-victims-consider-suicide-why-arent-schools-doing-more-to-stop-it
[https://perma.cc/C9L8-T4QQ] (discussing emotional ramifications to adolescent victims of revenge
pornography).
72 See, e.g., Samantha Bates, Revenge Porn and Mental Health: A Qualitative Analysis of the Mental
Health Effects of Revenge Porn on Female Survivors, 12 FEMINIST CRIMINOLOGY 22, 30–34 (2017)
(describing negative mental-health effects after victimization via revenge pornography).
73 Citron, supra note 6, at 1927–28.
74 See Drew Harwell, Fake-Porn Videos Are Being Weaponized to Harass and Humiliate Women:
‘Everybody Is a Potential Target,’ WASH. POST (Dec. 30, 2018, 9:00 AM), https://www.
washingtonpost.com/technology/2018/12/30/fake-porn-videos-are-being-weaponized-harass-humiliatewomen-everybody-is-potential-target/ [https://perma.cc/D7BD-3GYD].
75 Citron, supra note 6, at 1925.
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2. Societal Harms
In contrast to the limited consideration of nonpornographic deepfakes
in the domain of individual dignity, there has been a great deal of concern
about the potential of political deepfake videos to interfere with elections,
harm national security, and undermine democratic institutions.
Hypotheticals are routinely proposed, including the possibility of the release
of deepfake videos the night before an election, a deepfake video depicting
a government official declaring war, or a deepfake video confirming a rumor
about a politician.76 Chesney and Citron note that deepfake videos could
jeopardize national security in myriad ways, including their use in military
operations and to distract intelligence agencies.77
Though we have yet to see a sophisticated deepfake informational
campaign, deepfake videos of political figures have already been made. In
April 2018, director Jordan Peele and Buzzfeed CEO Jonah Peretti released
a deepfake video depicting President Barack Obama saying outrageous
things, such as “Ben Carson is in the sunken place,” and “Stay woke,
bitches.”78 Of course, President Obama has not said those things publicly,
and the video ultimately reveals Jordan Peele as the voice actor. The video
serves as a public service announcement to viewers about being “more
vigilant with what we trust from the internet.”79 A similar video was created
of Prime Minister Boris Johnson that depicted him endorsing his thenpolitical opponent. As with the Obama deepfake video, the deepfaked
version of Boris Johnson reveals the video is a deepfake and warns viewers
that “the unregulated power of technologies like this risk fueling
misinformation, eroding trust, and compromising democracy.”80

76

Brown, supra note 67, at 9.
Chesney & Citron, supra note 2, at 1777 (identifying seven dimensions of societal harms,
including “distortion of democratic discourse on important policy questions; manipulation of elections;
erosion of trust in significant public and private institutions; enhancement and exploitation of social
divisions; harm to specific military or intelligence operations or capabilities; threats to the economy; and
damage to international relations”).
78 Aja Romano, Jordan Peele’s Simulated Obama PSA Is a Double-Edged Warning Against Fake
News, VOX (Apr. 18, 2018, 3:00 PM), https://www.vox.com/2018/4/18/17252410/jordan-peele-obamadeepfake-buzzfeed [https://perma.cc/5XCQ-DWRC].
79 BuzzFeedVideo, You Won’t Believe What Obama Says in This Video!, YOUTUBE (Apr. 17, 2018),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cQ54GDm1eL0&feature=emb_title
[https://perma.cc/PU4TBBU5].
80 Darren Altman, Future Advocacy & Bill Posters, DeepFake Boris Johnson, YOUTUBE (Nov. 13,
2019), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gHbF-4anWbE [https://perma.cc/8RZW-QB3H].
77
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Deepfake videos depicting politicians have generally remained satirical
and have yet to undermine an American election,81 but there have been
instances when doctored videos have been the subject of national news. For
example, a doctored video of House Speaker Nancy Pelosi emerged online
in May 2019.82 Also known as a “shallowfake,” this video was slightly
altered to depict Pelosi slurring her words.83 While the video was identified
as altered by media outlets, its release and subsequent reporting highlighted
the implications of deepfake technology.84
At the core of the concern for deepfake technology is the spread of
misinformation. Scholars have highlighted the acute issue this poses for
journalists.85 Chesney and Citron note that news organizations may
encounter challenges to authenticating evidence, which leads to a chilling
effect on news reporting.86 Professor Nina Brown highlights a broader effect
of deepfake technology: erosion of public trust.87 She suggests that when
people can no longer believe what they see, people will “deny actual events
captured on video” and “be disinclined to trust any video evidence, whether
offered as part of a news story, or as evidence in a courtroom.”88 Similarly,
Professor Regina Rini argues “that backstop crises triggered by contested
deepfakes will lead to erosion of the reliability that recordings provide to our
testimonial practices.”89 Americans are already reported to mistrust the
media,90 so the rise in deepfake technology may exacerbate this mistrust.
81

Gary Grossman, Deepfakes May Not Have Upended the 2020 U.S. Election, but Their Day Is
Coming, VENTURE BEAT (Nov. 1, 2020, 2:22 PM), https://venturebeat.com/2020/11/01/deepfakes-maynot-have-upended-the-2020-u-s-election-but-their-day-is-coming/ [https://perma.cc/82DS-738P].
82 Doctored Nancy Pelosi Video Highlights Threat of “Deepfake” Tech, CBS NEWS (May 26, 2019,
9:26 AM) [hereinafter Doctored Nancy Pelosi Video], https://www.cbsnews.com/news/doctored-nancypelosi-video-highlights-threat-of-deepfake-tech-2019-05-25/ [https://perma.cc/MLZ9-B9G7].
83 Jane Lytvynenko & Craig Silverman, Why the Altered Videos of Pelosi Will Never Go Away,
BUZZFEED NEWS (May 27, 2019), https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/janelytvynenko/alteredvideos-of-pelosi-will-never-go-away [https://perma.cc/Q7MV-VW54].
84
See Doctored Nancy Pelosi Video, supra note 82; Drew Harwell, Faked Pelosi Videos, Slowed to
Make Her Appear Drunk, Spread Across Social Media, WASH. POST (May 24, 2019, 3:41 PM), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2019/05/23/faked-pelosi-videos-slowed-make-her-appear-drunkspread-across-social-media/ [https://perma.cc/LYV8-PPBH]; Maheen Sadiq, Real v Fake: Debunking the
‘Drunk’ Nancy Pelosi Footage – Video, GUARDIAN (May 24, 2019, 12:38 PM), https://www.theguardian.
com/us-news/video/2019/may/24/real-v-fake-debunking-the-drunk-nancy-pelosi-footage-video [https://
perma.cc/NV8J-5YR2].
85 Brown, supra note 67, at 12; Chesney & Citron, supra note 2, at 1784.
86 Chesney & Citron, supra note 2, at 1784–85.
87
Brown, supra note 67, at 8–14.
88 Id. at 11.
89 Regina Rini, Deepfakes and the Epistemic Backstop, 20 PHILOSOPHERS’ IMPRINT 1, 11 (2020).
90 Megan Brenan, Americans Remain Distrustful of Mass Media, GALLUP (Sept. 30, 2020),
https://news.gallup.com/poll/321116/americans-remain-distrustful-mass-media.aspx [https://perma.cc/
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Professors Jessica Silbey and Woodrow Hartzog actually refer to this as an
“upside” of deepfakes in that they expose the existing rot in our journalistic
and electoral institutions and may stimulate broader reforms.91
C. Existing Civil and Criminal Frameworks
Despite this growing discussion of deepfake harms, there are few
remedies under current law. This Section reviews the various civil remedies
that might be available to victims of deepfakes, paying specific attention to
unlabeled deepfakes because falsity is often determinative in privacy law.
Traditional tort and privacy law causes of action such as public
disclosure of private fact and intrusion upon seclusion are generally not
applicable in the deepfake context. Public disclosure of private fact involves
the disclosure of a private matter that is “highly offensive to a reasonable
person” and “not of legitimate concern to the public.”92 But deepfakes are
not facts⎯they are entirely made up⎯so they cannot be private facts.
Intrusion upon seclusion claims involve an intentional intrusion, “physically
or otherwise, upon the solitude or seclusion of another or his private affairs
or concerns” that “would be highly offensive to a reasonable person.”93 When
distributors create deepfake videos using photographs found on the internet,
no intrusion is required.94 This is even clearer in the celebrity context, where
a deepfake creator need commit no fresh intrusion to repurpose internet
photographs taken by paparazzi or posted on social media.95 From a privacyas-information standpoint, there is not even a privacy intrusion: all that is
being used is a person’s face, which is generally not private.96

G652-D6JC] (reporting that 27% of Americans trust the media “not very much” and 33% trust the media
“not at all”).
91 See Jessica Silbey & Woodrow Hartzog, The Upside of Deep Fakes, 78 MD. L. REV. 960, 964–65
(2019) (“Perhaps the vivid threat of deep fakes can muster will to salvage journalism from the ravages of
an economic system transformed by technology that appears to value viral lies over truth by subsidizing
a free press with public funds and incentivizing the reestablishment of the journalistic profession.”).
92 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (AM. L. INST. 1977).
93 Id. § 652B.
94 Chesney & Citron, supra note 2, at 1795 (“Deep-fakes usually will not involve invasions of spaces
(either physical or conceptual like email inboxes) in which individuals have a reasonable expectation of
privacy.”); see also Nader v. Gen. Motors Corp., 255 N.E.2d 765, 770 (N.Y. 1970) (discussing how some
acts are not intrusions upon seclusion because they are not done to obtain information).
95 Spivak, supra note 8, at 379 (“In many (though not all) cases, the deepfake subject has either put
the photos into the public by posting them online or consented to their collection by posing for paparazzi.
Deepfakers have not violated anyone’s personal space to obtain the necessary information to create and
publish their work.”).
96 See, e.g., United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 14 (1972) (“No person can have a reasonable
expectation that others will not know the sound of his voice, any more than he can reasonably expect that
his face will be a mystery to the world.”).
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Victims of nonconsensual deepfake videos may have more success with
defamation or false light claims if it is unclear that the videos are fake.
Defamation requires the publication of a false fact that harms the reputation
of another.97 False light is a similar cause of action that requires one to be
portrayed falsely in a manner that is “highly offensive to a reasonable
person.”98 So there could easily be liability if a convincing deepfake showed
a person committing a crime or engaging in disreputable conduct. Courts are
also likely to find unlabeled pornographic deepfakes defamatory given the
reputational harms of being in a pornographic video.99 Similarly, courts may
uphold a false light claim by concluding that falsely depicting a person as
engaging in sexual conduct is highly offensive to a reasonable person.100
Though public figures generally face additional burdens under defamation
law, these barriers likely will not pose substantial obstacles here.101
Private citizens and public figures may therefore be successful in
bringing defamation or false light claims for unlabeled pornographic
deepfakes and unlabeled nonpornographic deepfakes that depict disreputable
conduct. Most likely, the dispute in a particular case would be over whether
the deepfake video was presented as if it were real. However, satirical
deepfakes are likely more challenging cases. Though deepfake videos that
depict a person engaging in illegal or extreme behavior are more likely to
harm a person’s reputation⎯qualifying for defamation liability⎯parody or
satirical deepfake videos that depict an individual engaging in merely
embarrassing behavior likely do not inflict the same reputational harm.
A final tort possibility is intentional infliction of emotional distress.102
This tort is generally difficult to satisfy—because it requires extremely
97

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 558−59.
Id. § 652E.
99 Chesney & Citron, supra note 2, at 1772–75 (describing how being depicted in fake pornography
videos may be expected to have collateral consequences for future social and employment prospects given
existing research on nonconsensual pornography).
100 See Kareem Gibson, Note, Deepfakes and Involuntary Pornography: Can Our Current Legal
Framework Address This Technology?, 66 WAYNE L. REV. 259, 278 (2020).
101 In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, the Supreme Court held that public figures must prove a
heightened mens rea of “actual malice”—that the statement was made “with knowledge that it was false
or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.” 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964). But the creator
of a deepfake knows it is fake, so this requirement would generally be satisfied. Unlike with defamation,
the Supreme Court has not decided whether the heightened standard applies to false light claims, but some
jurisdictions have concluded that it does. See, e.g., West v. Media Gen. Convergence, Inc., 53 S.W.3d
640, 647 (Tenn. 2001) (“We hold that actual malice is the appropriate standard for false light claims when
the plaintiff is a public official or public figure, or when the claim is asserted by a private individual about
a matter of public concern.”).
102 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (“One who by extreme and outrageous conduct
intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress to another is subject to liability for such
emotional distress, and if bodily harm to the other results from it, for such bodily harm.”).
98
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outrageous conduct—and it faces substantial First Amendment problems
when applied to public figures or speech on public issues. In Hustler
Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, for example, the famous pastor Jerry Falwell sued
Hustler Magazine for, among other things, intentional infliction of emotional
distress for publishing what might be considered the written equivalent of a
deepfake—a parody advertisement that said Falwell had engaged in sexual
conduct with his mother in an outhouse.103 Noting that the advertisement in
question was a departure from traditional caricatures of political figures, the
Court nevertheless protected the speech to avoid chilling political
dialogue.104 Similarly, extreme anti-gay-rights protests adjacent to a military
funeral were held to not give rise to intentional infliction of emotional
distress because they concerned a major public issue and violated no other
laws.105 This tort would therefore be a hard sell in any politically charged
case.
Consequently, tort law provides little protection against deepfakes
unless the deepfakes purport to be accurate depictions of facts. A deepfake
that announces itself as fake is immune to the major privacy torts, fails the
test for defamation, and is unlikely to be extreme enough to qualify for
intentional infliction of emotional distress. Some states may provide some
relief through right-of-publicity laws, but these often protect against the
exploitation of a person’s likeness in advertising and commerce, rather than
in general.106 A minority of states provide broader protection here, however,
that may apply to deepfakes.107
Statutory protection under nonconsensual-pornography laws is little
better in almost all states. State laws that do not explicitly address deepfakes
seldom apply to deepfakes. For example, Texas’s nonconsensualpornography statute criminalizes the nonconsensual disclosure of “visual
material depicting another person with the person’s intimate parts exposed
or engaged in sexual conduct.”108 Statutes written in this manner likely do
not apply to deepfake pornography because those videos usually do not
depict the real body of the victim. Some states statutes, for example, North
Dakota’s, are broader and prohibit the dissemination of a “visual depiction”
103

485 U.S. 46, 48 (1988).
Id. at 55–57.
105 Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 454–58 (2011).
106 See, e.g., 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. 1075/5, /35 (requiring a use for “a commercial purpose”); VA.
CODE ANN. § 8.01-40 (2021) (requiring use “for advertising purposes or for the purposes of trade”); CAL.
CIV. CODE § 3344 (West 2021) (requiring use “for purposes of advertising or selling, or soliciting
purchases of, products, merchandise, goods or services”).
107 See, for example, OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 1450 (2021), an anti-catfishing statute that allows for a
cause of action against those who engage in impersonation online with an intent to harass.
108 TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.16 (West 2019) (emphasis added).
104
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or “any intimate image” that depicts nudity or sexual conduct.109 A deepfake
pornographic video fits under that definition. The North Dakota statute,
however, further requires that the dissemination of the image or video be in
violation of a reasonable expectation of privacy.110 Although there are
inherent privacy concerns with deepfake pornography, deepfake
pornography is often made without the victim’s knowledge, so statutes
requiring that the victim intended that an image be kept private do not
translate to the deepfake context. This type of requirement is common in
nonconsensual-pornography statutes. New York’s statute includes as an
element that the “still or video image was taken under circumstances when
the person depicted had a reasonable expectation that the image would
remain private and the actor knew or reasonably should have known the
person depicted intended for the still or video image to remain private.”111
Similarly, Connecticut’s statute requires that an image be disseminated with
the knowledge that the person depicted “understood that the image would
not be so disseminated.”112 A recent analysis by Professors Jonathan Sales
and Jessica Magaldi found that thirty nonconsensual-pornography statutes
have a similar expectation of privacy requirements.113
Several new laws specifically targeting deepfakes were passed in 2019
and 2020. These laws are highly targeted and still few in number. Virginia,
for example, amended its nonconsensual-pornography statute to address
deepfakes specifically.114 Section 1708.86 of the California Civil Code
provides a civil cause of action for an individual who is depicted in a
pornographic deepfake video without their consent. The statute imposes civil
liability on anyone who either creates and distributes the deepfake or who
distributes the deepfake knowing it was created without consent.115 The
statute carves out exceptions to liability, including when the deepfake is “[a]
matter of legitimate public concern” or “[a] work of political or newsworthy
value or similar work.”116 Notably, that the deepfake video is labeled as fake

109

N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-17-07.2 (2015).
Id.
111 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 245.15 (McKinney 2019).
112 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-189c (2021).
113 Jonathan S. Sales & Jessica A. Magaldi, Deconstructing the Statutory Landscape of “Revenge
Porn”: An Evaluation of the Elements that Make an Effective Nonconsensual Pornography Statute,
57 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1499, 1524 (2020).
114 See VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-386.2 (West 2019). In 2019, Virginia amended its revenge
pornography statute to include “any videographic or still image created by any means whatsoever that
depicts another person.” Id.
115 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1708.86(b)(1)–(2) (West 2020).
116 Id. § 1708.86(c)(1)(B)(i)−(ii).
110
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is not a permissible defense.117 A victim has the option to recover either
economic and non-economic damages caused by the deepfake video or
substantial statutory damages.118 The statutory damages range from $1,500
to $30,000 unless the distributor acted with malice, in which case a victim
can recover up to $150,000.119 A victim may also recover punitive damages
and attorneys’ fees, as well as receive injunctive relief.120
Section 20010 of the California Elections Code creates a civil cause of
action for a political candidate who appears in a deepfake video. The statute
prohibits the distribution of unlabeled “materially deceptive audio or visual
media” featuring “a candidate for elective office [who] will appear on the
ballot” with “the intent to injure the candidate’s reputation or to deceive a
voter” within sixty days of an election.121 The statute defines “materially
deceptive audio or visual media” as any audio or video of a candidate that
has been intentionally manipulated so that it appears authentic to a
reasonable person and causes “a reasonable person to have a fundamentally
different understanding or impression of the expressive content” than if they
were to hear or see the unedited image, audio, or video.122 However, the
statute permits distribution if the media constitutes parody or satire123 or is
labeled with the following message: “This [image, video, or audio] has been
manipulated.”124 A candidate appearing in the manipulated media may seek
injunctive relief to stop the distribution.125 Texas has passed a similar
provision that protects candidates in the lead-up to elections.126 Neither of
these statutes provides any protection to the common citizen against
nonpornographic deepfakes, however. In contrast with the law of
defamation⎯where public figures are disadvantaged compared to private
figures127⎯here, only public figures are protected and only in a particular
time frame.

117

Id. § 1708.86(d).
Id. § 1708.86(e)(1)(B)(i)−(ii).
119 Id. § 1708.86(e)(1)(B)(ii)(I)−(II).
120 Id. § 1708.86(e)(1)(C)−(E).
121 CAL. ELEC. CODE § 20010(a) (West 2020).
122 Id. § 20010(e)(1)–(2).
123 Id. § 20010(d)(5).
124 Id. § 20010(b)(1).
125 Id. § 20010(c)(1).
126 TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. § 255.004(d) (West 2019).
127 See, e.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964) (requiring elevated mens rea
for a person to be liable for defamation of a public figure).
118
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One of the most recent state laws on deepfakes was passed in New York
on November 30, 2020.128 This action provided two new protections against
deepfake videos. First, it expanded the New York right-of-publicity law to
cover digitally manipulated likenesses and allow for protection to run for
forty years after the depicted person’s death. But this right-of-publicity
statute, like most others, only applies to limited commercial uses.
Specifically, it bars uses in advertising or on products.129 This would cover
very few current deepfakes, as most existing deepfakes are either satirical or
pornographic, rather than commercial. The statute also provides limited
protection against the use of unauthorized deepfakes in audiovisual works
unless the works include a conspicuous disclaimer.130
The second form of new protection provided by New York is against
pornographic deepfakes. These are prohibited in language similar to that of
the new California statute: it is a violation to distribute unauthorized
deepfakes of a person showing them “nude, meaning with an unclothed or
exposed intimate part . . . or appearing to engage in, or being subjected to,
sexual conduct.”131 This provision specifically says that a disclaimer saying
the representation is fake is not a defense against liability.132 Interestingly,
this statute further provides that consent to appear in deepfake pornography
is valid only if obtained through a rigorous process, with substantial notice
to the subject and a right to revoke consent.133
Looking at the variations across these new deepfake laws gives a sense
of the broad range of options that will confront legislatures over the next
several years. Depending on which harms, and which victims, most concern
a state, the state could ban deepfake pornography, deepfake election
interference, deepfake commercial exploitation, or all three. This range of
possibilities highlights the need to determine which deepfakes are viewed as
morally wrong and practically harmful by the public. Part II begins to answer
those questions.

128 Governor Cuomo Signs Legislation Establishing a “Right to Publicity” for Deceased Individuals
to Protect Against the Commercial Exploitation of Their Name or Likeness, N.Y. STATE (Nov. 30, 2020),
https://www.governor.ny.gov/news/governor-cuomo-signs-legislation-establishing-right-publicitydeceased-individuals-protect [https://perma.cc/PAJ7-EG9A].
129 N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 50-f(2)(a) (McKinney 2021).
130 Id. § 50-f(2)(b) (prohibiting use “in a scripted audiovisual work as a fictional character or for the
live performance of a musical work . . . if the use is likely to deceive the public into thinking it was
authorized by the person [or their representatives]” and clarifying that “[a] use shall not be considered
likely to deceive the public . . . if the person making such use provides a conspicuous disclaimer in the
credits”).
131 Id. § 52-c(1)(e).
132 Id. § 52-c(2)(b).
133 Id. § 52-c(3)(a)–(b).
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II. THREE STUDIES OF DEEPFAKE ATTITUDES
Given the possibility of substantial future legislative activity in this area
and the unsettled literature on deepfake harms, it is essential to better
understand how the public views deepfakes. Are all deepfakes problematic,
or only ones that are pornographic or depict certain kinds of conduct? Are
deepfakes of all people problematic, or only ones of people who are not
politicians and celebrities? One can easily see how pornographic deepfakes,
or Nazi-promoting attitudinal deepfakes, can harm the dignity of those
depicted. But not all deepfakes are of that sort. If someone creates a deepfake
of the president doing Fortnite dances, is that similarly an affront to dignity?
After all, Jordan Peele was not widely condemned for participating in the
creation of a comedic deepfake of President Barack Obama.134
Further, American law places great faith in the marketplace of ideas.
False claims about a person can lead to liability, but American law
recognizes that public figures do not have a right to avoid being the subjects
of satire, however little they may enjoy the experience.135 Likewise, the
publication of a publicly taken photograph of a person generally does not run
afoul of state privacy laws.136 Before creating what may amount to a new
privacy right, we should first carefully mark the boundaries of what we seek
to protect.
Very little is known about the attitudes of everyday people toward
deepfakes. One nonacademic survey of an unrepresentative sample showed
that people thought that deepfakes would do more harm than good and that
a majority wanted to criminalize deepfakes.137 Yet this study did not address
any of the above questions about how different deepfakes would be

134 Most reporting on this took a very matter-of-fact approach. For an example of a matter-of-fact
tone used in reporting on the comedic deepfake of President Obama, see James Vincent, Watch Jordan
Peele Use AI to Make Barack Obama Deliver a PSA About Fake News, VERGE (Apr. 17, 2018, 1:14 PM),
https://www.theverge.com/tldr/2018/4/17/17247334/ai-fake-news-video-barack-obama-jordan-peelebuzzfeed [https://perma.cc/QMA2-BQST]. The authors have not found any articles describing the
creation as inappropriate.
135 See, e.g., Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 55–57 (1988) (holding that a public
figure cannot sustain a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress against the publisher of a
parody depicting the plaintiff because the “outrageous” standard of conduct as applied to political
cartoons would invite juries to impose their own “tastes or views” in violation of the First Amendment).
136 See, e.g., Gill v. Hearst Pub. Co., 253 P.2d 441, 444–45 (Cal. 1953) (holding that plaintiffs waived
their right to privacy by “expos[ing] themselves to public gaze in a pose open to the view of any persons
who might then be at or near” them, and therefore publication of their photograph did not invade their
right of privacy).
137 Toni Allen, Dodging Deception & Seeking Truth Online [Survey Results], WHO IS HOSTING THIS
(Sept. 19, 2019), https://www.whoishostingthis.com/blog/2019/09/02/seeking-trust-online/ [https://
perma.cc/2LJN-D3UP]. The survey was conducted of 981 “internet users,” from whom few
demographics were reported. Id.
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viewed.138 It did not ask about differences between pornographic and
nonpornographic deepfakes or bring up the idea of labeling deepfakes as
fake—which appear to be the two main distinctions discussed by current
legislative proposals. Therefore, it provides little guidance for future
legislation.
To fill this gap and explore how everyday people view different kinds
of deepfake videos, we conducted a study with a representative sample of
the U.S. adult population. This Part discusses the design and methodology
of the study, our sample, and findings from the study.
To conduct our primary study, we wrote scenarios that captured
attitudes toward deepfake videos in the pornographic and nonpornographic
contexts independently. Further, we wrote a range of scenarios for each
context, sampling broadly from the universe of possible uses of deepfakes.
One of our main goals was to determine if labeling the deepfake as fake
mattered. The question of labeling is particularly important in this context
because some proposals would only ban unlabeled deepfake videos.139
Further, whether a deepfake video is labeled has implications for a victim’s
ability to seek redress under theories of defamation, false light, or intentional
infliction of emotional distress.140
We also included scenarios that depicted the victims as either public
figures or private individuals. Public figures are treated differently under
various tort laws, and courts have provided substantial protection for speech
concerning them.141 The question remains whether the same considerations
are consistent in the context of visual deepfake depictions.
For this study, a sample of American adults were recruited by Dynata,
an online survey firm with an established panel of respondents.142 The
demographics of the sample were set to match the U.S. Census proportions
on the dimensions of age, sex, region, education, race, and ethnicity. Full
138 The study provided a brief description of deepfakes, saying that they were AI-produced videos
depicting people saying or doing things that they did not say or do. It then asked, “Do you believe
deepfaking someone without consent should be illegal or legal?” Id. The study does not appear to have
provided subjects with any particular examples of deepfakes.
139 See, e.g., CAL. ELEC. CODE § 20010(b)(1) (West 2020) (providing no liability for labeled videos);
Ruiz, supra note 15 (noting one federal bill would require a deepfake “watermark” label).
140 See supra Section I.C.
141 See, e.g., Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 54–56 (1988) (“From the viewpoint of
history it is clear that our political discourse would have been considerably poorer without [satirical
cartoons].”); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–81 (1964) (“The importance to the state and
to society of [discussing the character and qualifications of candidates for their suffrages] is so vast, and
the advantages derived are so great, that they more than counterbalance the inconvenience of private
persons whose conduct may be involved . . . .” (quoting Coleman v. MacLennan, 98 P. 281, 286 (Kan.
1908))).
142 DYNATA, PANEL BOOK 5–6 (2020).

635

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

demographics are reported in Appendix A. The final sample contained 1,141
individuals.143 The study was conducted in October 2020 through Qualtrics.
Respondents received an email from Dynata inviting them to participate in
the survey. If they clicked on the provided link, then they were routed to a
Qualtrics survey hosted by Northwestern University. By monitoring the
demographics of those completing the survey, Dynata targeted waves of
survey invitations to create a final sample consistent with the desired quotas.
This study had two basic parts. The first part presented participants with
vignettes that described people making deepfake videos of various types.
Participants were asked to rate these scenarios on several dimensions and
decide whether it should be possible to criminally punish the person making
the video. The purpose of using vignettes in this part was to introduce
participants to deepfakes, a concept with which many of them might have
been unfamiliar, and to give them examples of how deepfake technology
could be used. This reduced the chance that participants would imagine
drastically different conduct when thinking about deepfakes. The second part
of the study asked a series of questions about the harmfulness of deepfakes,
more generally, outside the context of a particular set of facts.
Study participants were randomly assigned to receive vignettes about
one of four different types of deepfake videos: pornographic or attitudinal
deepfakes that were either labeled as fake or not. The pornographic vignettes
all included sexualized content, with the deepfake subject depicted either
having sex or engaged in sexual behavior. By contrast, the deepfakes we
called attitudinal incorporated a range of different contents⎯from the silly
to the defamatory to the totally mundane. We termed these attitudinal
because the key behavior in the videos was often expressive—the deepfake
subject was made to convey attitudes or facts.
In addition to being pornographic or attitudinal in content, the videos
were either labeled or unlabeled. Labeled videos were described as clearly
identified as fake by the video maker. For unlabeled videos, in contrast, it
was clearly stated that the video creator did not indicate the video was fake.
The following was the default unlabeled pornographic deepfake scenario:

143 Inattentive participants were screened from the final sample based on two criteria. First,
participants who did not give the appropriate response to an attention-check question—a question asking
participants to give a particular response—or a CAPTCHA item were unable to complete the study.
Second, participants were screened from the final sample if they finished the study in less than one-third
of the time taken by the median participant or if they wrote gibberish in a comment box. Of the
participants who completed the study, 3.7% were screened on the basis of time or gibberish. For a
discussion of attention checks in legal surveys, see Matthew B. Kugler & R. Charles Henn, Internet
Surveys in Trademark Cases: Benefits, Challenges, and Solutions, in TRADEMARK AND DECEPTIVE
ADVERTISING SURVEYS (Shari Seidman Diamond & Jerre B. Swann eds., 2d ed. forthcoming 2021).
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Imagine Jane is a friend of Will. Will finds a series of photos of Jane online.
Will takes the photos and uses an app to merge her face onto a pornographic
video. The final video shows Jane’s face on the body of a naked woman having
sex with a man. The video shows the entirety of the naked woman’s body.
Jane’s face is clearly identifiable in the video. Will posts the video online
publicly, and he includes Jane’s first and last name. Though this video is made
up, a viewer cannot easily tell that it has been altered. Will does not indicate
that it is fake when he posts it.

The scenario makes it clear that the deepfake video used publicly
available photos of the video subject, that it included graphic sex, that it
looked genuine, and that it was posted publicly in a way that made it easily
linked to the real identity of the video subject. The labeled version replaced
the last sentence with, “In the video title and as a caption on the video, Will
writes ‘This is fake’ to show that it is fake.” This disclaimer was intended to
be completely unambiguous and as permanent as any digital watermark
could reasonably be. Each participant received only one type of vignette. For
example, every vignette read by Participant A was about pornographic
deepfakes that were labeled, and every vignette read by Participant B was
about attitudinal deepfakes that were unlabeled. The full text of the unlabeled
scenarios is available in Appendix B. In each case, the labeled version
differed only in the last sentence, as in the above example.
Within each of these four conditions, participants rated multiple
scenarios in a random order. For each scenario, the participant answered
three questions:
(1) How morally blameworthy was the video maker’s conduct (1: Not
at All to 6: Very Much)?;
(2) How harmful was this to the deepfake video subject (same scale)?;
and
(3) How, if at all, should it be possible to punish the person making the
video?

This last question was answered on the following scale:
(1) It should not be possible to punish him; this should not be a crime;
(2) It should be punished with a fine (less than $500);
(3) It should be punished like a minor crime (a year or less in jail); and
(4) It should be punished like a major crime (up to 10 years in jail).

We will review the results for the pornographic deepfakes before
turning to the attitudinal deepfakes and closing with the overall questions
about deepfake harmfulness. Table 1 shows the full list of scenarios used in
the study. Participants received either the pornographic or attitudinal
scenarios (if attitudinal, they saw both “private” and “politician” videos) that
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were either labeled as fake or not. In total, 283 participants received the
unlabeled attitudinal scenarios, 281 the labeled attitudinal scenarios, 287 the
unlabeled pornographic scenarios, and 290 the labeled pornographic
scenarios.
TABLE 1: FULL LIST OF SCENARIOS USED IN THE STUDY
Type

Pornographic

Attitudinal,
Private

Attitudinal,
Politician

Scenario
Written Pornographic Story, Friend
Deepfake (DF) Pornographic Video, Friend (Default Condition)
DF Pornographic Video, Celebrity
DF Pornographic Video, Sexualized Voice
DF Pornographic Video, No Nudity, BDSM
DF Pornographic Video, Personal Use, No Consent, Friend
DF Pornographic Video, Personal Use, Consent, Friend
Written Cocaine-Use Story
DF Cocaine-Use Video
DF Self-Insult
DF Scientist Biography, Dead
DF Scientist Biography, Living
Written Handshake-with-Child-Molester Story
DF Handshake-with-Child-Molester Video
DF Terror Endorsement
DF Silly Song, No Consent
DF Silly Song, Consent
DF Polling Place, No Consent
DF Polling Place, Consent

Analyses for these results took the form of a series of Analysis of
Variance (ANOVA) tests on each of the dependent measures. ANOVAs test
whether scores from two or more samples differ systematically enough that
the samples are likely to be statistically distinct. Comparisons across labeling
condition, looking at the effect of labeled versus not, were between-subject
because different people saw the labeled and unlabeled vignettes.
Comparisons across different labeled scenarios––such as comparing the
default pornography deepfake condition to several of the other pornographic
variants––were within-subject: the same people rated each of the labeled
pornographic scenarios. Most of the analyses that follow are therefore mixed
ANOVAs. For example, the first analysis below is a mixed 2x2 ANOVA
that looks at the difference between a pornographic deepfake video and a
pornographic written story (within-subject comparison, the same people saw
both) and the difference between those scenarios being labeled as fake or not
labeled as fake (a between-subject comparison with different people seeing
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each possibility), as well as their interaction term. So this ANOVA tests
whether the written story is different than the deepfake video (the main effect
of video), whether labeled stories or videos are different than unlabeled
stories or videos (the main effect of labeling), and whether the effect of
labeling differs for stories and videos (the interaction between labeling and
video).
A. Impressions of Pornographic Deepfakes
The default deepfake pornographic condition—in which our
protagonist makes a deepfake video of a female friend that depicts the friend
having sexual intercourse with a man, without labeling it as fake, and posts
the video online—was viewed as highly blameworthy, extremely harmful to
the person depicted, and deserving of substantial punishment (see Table 2).
The first analysis here contrasts the protagonist making a deepfake
pornographic video about his friend with the protagonist creating a written
story describing the same conduct. Though writing and posting a
pornographic story featuring the same conduct was viewed as less
blameworthy, harmful, and deserving of punishment,144 that act was also
rated as quite serious, with only 10.5% not wanting to punish it criminally
accompanied by relatively high blameworthiness and harm scores (Table 2).
TABLE 2: COMPARISON OF DEEPFAKE PORNOGRAPHIC VIDEO TO WRITTEN STORY
Unlabeled
Labeled
Blameworthy
5.44
(1.25)
5.36
(1.27)
Deepfake
Harm
5.43
(1.20)
5.43
(1.14)
Pornographic
Punishment
3.08
(0.94)
2.91
(0.92)
Video, Friend
Percentage not a crime
7.3%
8.0%
Blameworthy
5.31
(1.33)
4.96
(1.54)
Written
Harm
5.29
(1.20)
5.08
(1.41)
Pornographic
Punishment
2.78
(0.95)
2.45
(0.99)
Story, Friend
Percentage not a crime
10.5%
18.3%
Note. Means (standard deviations in parentheses). Blameworthiness and harmfulness were rated
on 6-point scales. Punishment was on a 4-point scale. The proportion of respondents choosing
the lowest punishment option, “It should not be possible to punish him; this should not be a
crime,” is reported in the bottom row for each scenario.

144 A 2x2 ANOVA test (video or written as a within-subjects factor, labeled versus not as a betweensubjects factor) revealed a significant main effect for the content being a video on each of the three
measures. Blameworthiness: F(1, 571) = 23.36, p < 0.001 η2 = 0.04. Harm: F(1, 571) = 22.24, p < 0.001
η2 = 0.04. Punishment: F(1, 571) = 108.79, p < 0.001 η2 = 0.16.
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The effect of labeling this story or video as fake depended on whether
the content was written or a deepfake video.145 Labeling helped significantly
for the written story⎯causing participants to view it as less harmful, less
wrongful, and deserving of less punishment⎯but mattered much less for the
video. Labeling the video produced only a small significant effect on
punishment, and that effect was one-third the size of the effect for the written
story.146 There was no significant effect of labeling on the perceived
harmfulness or blameworthiness of the video.
The remaining deepfake pornographic cases were then compared to this
default friend deepfake video case (see Table 3).147 In one, the deepfake was
of a celebrity rather than a friend. Everything else was the same: the video
was still posted online and still clearly identified the celebrity. Targeting a
celebrity rather than a friend was viewed as mitigating on each of the three
dependent measures, but only very slightly. A full 90.2% of the sample still
wanted to criminalize this conduct in the unlabeled condition. Two other
variants that included sexualized behavior but no nudity⎯spanking in one
and seductive speaking in the other⎯were also viewed only slightly more
leniently than the default case.

145 The mixed ANOVA tests revealed an interaction effect between labeling and content type.
Blameworthiness: F(1, 571) = 6.54, p < 0.05 η2 = 0.01. Harm: F(1, 571) = 4.30, p < 0.05 η2 = 0.01.
Punishment: F(1, 571) = 5.03, p < 0.05 η2 = 0.01.
146 A simple effects analysis looking at the effect of labeling for the written and video scenarios
separately revealed significant effects of labeling on the written scenario: F(1, 571) = 8.61, p < 0.001
η2 = 0.02. Harm: F(1, 571) = 3.67, p = 0.05 η2 = 0.01. Punishment: F(1, 571) = 16.58, p < 0.001
η2 = 0.03. But only a significant effect on punishment for the video: F(1, 571) = 0.55, ns. Harm: F(1,
571) = 0.00, ns. Punishment: F(1, 571) = 4.65, p < 0.05 η2 = 0.01.
147 This was a series of mixed ANOVA tests with labeling as a between-subjects factor and the type
of scenario (default versus celebrity; default versus no nudity, BDSM; default versus sexualized voice)
as a within-subjects factor. Table 3’s “Comparison with Default” column reports the F-values of the
within-subjects scenario factor.
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TABLE 3: COMPARISON OF VARIANTS TO DEFAULT DEEPFAKE PORNOGRAPHIC VIDEO
Unlabeled

Deepfake
Pornographic
Video, Celebrity
Deepfake
Pornographic
Video, No Nudity,
BDSM
Deepfake
Pornographic
Video, Sexualized
Voice
Deepfake
Pornographic
Video, Personal
Use, No Consent

Blameworthy
Harm
Punishment
Pct. not a crime
Blameworthy
Harm
Punishment
Pct. not a crime
Blameworthy
Harm
Punishment
Pct. not a crime
Blameworthy
Harm
Punishment
Pct. not a crime

5.30
5.27
2.94
9.8%
5.35
5.35
2.85
8.4%
5.29
5.21
2.86
10.1%
5.47
5.14
2.77
15.1%

(1.37)
(1.29)
(0.99)
(1.27)
(1.20)
(0.93)
(1.39)
(1.30)
(0.97)
(1.07)
(1.37)
(1.04)

(1.36)
(1.36)
(0.91)

Compared to Default Condition
(Collapsing Across Labeling
Categories)
F(1, 571) = 4.51* η2 = 0.01
F(1, 571) = 15.58*** η2 = 0.03
F(1, 571) = 6.18* η2 = 0.01

(1.24)
(1.26)
(0.89)

F(1, 571) = 2.06 η2 = 0.00
F(1, 571) = 17.07*** η2 = 0.03
F(1, 571) = 56.62*** η2 = 0.09

(1.34)
(1.34)
(0.93)

F(1, 570) = 6.86** η2 = 0.01
F(1, 570) = 24.31*** η2 = 0.04
F(1, 570) = 58.02*** η2 = 0.09

(1.56)
(1.67)
(1.09)

F(1, 270) = 4.77* η2 = 0.02
F(1, 270) = 29.22*** η2 = 0.10
F(1, 270) = 41.68*** η2 = 0.13

Labeled
5.31
5.21
2.89
9.0%
5.32
5.22
2.63
10.0%
5.26
5.19
2.60
12.8%
5.01
4.71
2.48
23.8%

Compared to No Consent
Blameworthy
3.86
(2.13)
3.86
(2.09)
F(1, 567) = 85.88*** η2 = 0.13
Deepfake
Harm
3.78
(2.05)
3.91
(2.01)
F(1, 567) = 50.85*** η2 = 0.08
Pornographic
Video, Personal
Punishment
2.08
(1.13)
1.96
(1.13)
F(1, 567) = 43.91*** η2 = 0.07
148
Use, Consent
Pct. not a crime
43.6%
51.2%
Note. Means (standard deviations in parentheses). Blameworthiness and harmfulness were rated on 6-point scales.
Punishment was on a 4-point scale. Statistical significance is indicated as * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. The
proportion of respondents choosing the lowest punishment option, “It should not be possible to punish him; this should
not be a crime,” is reported in the bottom row for each scenario.149

These two no-nudity scenarios address a question that arises under the
current California statute on pornographic deepfakes. This statute prohibits
videos depicting individuals who are “nude” or engaging in “sexual
conduct.”150 Sexual conduct is in turn described as masturbation, several
148 This analysis was between-participants, as each person got either the personal-use-with-consent
or personal-use-without-consent scenario.
149 Due to incomplete data for a few participants, not all comparisons have the same N. This did not
affect the means for the comparison deepfake case by more than two one-hundredths for any comparison
except the personal-use case, which was only shown to half the sample. For that analysis, the means for
the default case were: Blameworthiness unlabeled (M = 5.53, SD = 1.10), labeled (M = 5.27, SD = 1.36);
Harm unlabeled (M = 5.53, SD = 1.07), labeled (M = 5.26, SD = 1.34); Punishment unlabeled (M = 3.14,
SD = 0.94), labeled (M = 2.87, SD = 0.95).
150 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1708.86(a)(14) (West 2020) (defining sexually explicit material).
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different kinds of sexual intercourse, sexual penetration of the vagina or
rectum, ejaculation on a person, and “[s]adomasochistic abuse involving the
depicted individual.”151 A spanking scene would likely qualify under this last
prong, despite the lack of penetration or nudity. The sexualized-voice scene
does not depict the speaker engaging in any of those forms of sexual conduct,
and therefore would be outside the scope of the statute. Participants,
however, viewed all of these as equivalently problematic. Though there are
slight statistical differences between these and the default scenario, they are
quite small. All of the scenarios received blameworthiness and harm ratings
of above 5 on a 6-point scale. All earned criminalization ratings of above
85%.
The largest difference in preference for punishment, across all these
pornographic scenarios, was for the final scenario: where the maker of the
deepfake did not distribute it but instead kept it for his own personal use. But
that was still criminalized by 84.9% of respondents in the unlabeled
nonconsensual case and viewed as extremely blameworthy and harmful. This
undistributed creation would not fall within the scope of the California or
New York statutes, as they target only the disclosure of deepfake videos.152
In an additional wrinkle, half of the participants evaluating this
personal-use variant were presented with a version in which the maker of the
deepfake asked for and received the consent of the deepfake subject. The
other half was presented with a version in which the deepfake subject was
not asked for consent, consistent with the other pornographic scenarios. This
consent manipulation mattered a great deal. Ratings on all three measures
were significantly lower in the consent condition than in the condition where
consent was not mentioned (and the video was still unpublished): 43.6% of
participants in the unlabeled condition and 51.2% of participants in the
labeled condition did not seek to criminalize or punish this conduct when
consent was obtained (Table 3). Further, the distribution of blameworthiness
responses was markedly different here than in the other conditions. In the
default pornographic deepfake condition, only 4.3% chose the lowest
blameworthiness option. In the nonconsensual personal-use condition, 4.0%
chose that option. In the consensual personal-use condition, the distribution
is bimodal: 28.6% chose the lowest option, indicating that they believed the
protagonist did not do something morally wrong, and 38.9% chose the worst
option, with the remainder irregularly scattered between.
As discussed in Section I.C, the law of defamation would have little
difficulty punishing a statement that was false, looked as if it were meant to
151

Id. § 1708.86(a)(13) (defining sexual conduct).
Id. § 1708.86(b)(1) (creating a civil cause of action against anyone who “[c]reates and
intentionally discloses” (emphasis added)); N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 52-c(2)(a) (McKinney 2021).
152
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be taken as true, and caused harm to a person’s reputation. Labeling that
account as false would generally prevent liability, however. But this kind of
labeling does not have much effect on the perceived blameworthiness and
harmfulness of pornographic deepfake videos. Across all scenarios, labeling
mattered very little. In the four main variants (default friend, celebrity,
spanking, and speaking), there were no significant effects on labeling in the
analysis on harm or blameworthiness, and only an inconsistent mitigation
effect on punishment.153
Overall, then, people view the pornographic deepfake scenarios as
extremely blameworthy, harmful, and deserving of punishment. The written
stories, especially the written story labeled as fiction, are viewed more
leniently on each dimension than the videos. People still find them troubling,
however. Among the deepfake videos, three of the four variants (celebrity,
spanking, and sexualized voice) were barely different than the baseline
scenario in which the actor made a pornographic deepfake of a friend.
Making the victim a celebrity did not have a substantial mitigating effect,
nor did the two variants that excluded nudity but included sexualized content.
Also, across all of these scenarios, labeling only intermittently mattered.
Even deepfakes labeled as deepfakes were viewed as blameworthy, harmful,
and deserving of punishment.
B. Impressions of Attitudinal Deepfakes
In addition to the pornographic deepfake scenarios, we also asked about
attitudinal scenarios. These varied greatly in content. Some depicted the
deepfake subject doing something morally questionable, some of them doing
something silly, and some neither. None included sex or sexualized conduct,
however.
The main scenarios here depicted an everyday person or a politician
doing something morally blameworthy. The everyday person, described as a
friend, was depicted as doing cocaine. The politician was depicted as shaking
hands with a convicted child molester. Again, our first analysis here contrasts
the deepfake videos with written stories describing the same content (Table
4). Two major patterns emerged. First, the videos were significantly worse
153 See supra note 146 for the results labeling had on the default friend condition. In the celebrity
condition, labeling had no effect on blameworthiness, F(1, 573) = 0.01, ns η2 = 0.00; harm F(1,
573) = 0.28 ns η2 = 0.00; or punishment F(1, 573) = 0.47, ns η2 = 0.00.
In the no-nudity, BDSM condition, labeling had no effect on blameworthiness F(1, 572) = 0.05, ns
η2 = 0.00, or harm F(1, 572) = 0.02, ns η2 = 0.00, but there was an effect on punishment such that labeling
led to lower punishments F(1, 572) = 11.00, p < 0.001 η2 = 0.02.
In the sexualized-voice condition, labeling had no effect on blameworthiness F(1, 574) = 0.07, ns
η2 = 0.00, or harm F(1, 574) = 1.79, ns η2 = 0.00, but there was an effect on punishment F(1, 574) = 8.47,
p < 0.001 η2 = 0.02.
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on blameworthiness, harm, and punishment than the written stories
regardless of whether they were labeled.154 Second, and in contrast to the
pornographic scenarios, here, there was a significant labeling effect on each
of the three dependent measures, with labeling lowering the severity on each
for both written and video variants.155
TABLE 4: REACTIONS TO MAIN ATTITUDINAL SCENARIOS
Unlabeled
Labeled
Blameworthy
5.05
(1.48)
4.83
(1.46)
Harm
5.14
(1.35)
4.92
(1.36)
Video
Punishment
2.73
(0.95)
2.44
(0.94)
Private,
Percentage not a crime
12.0%
16.0%
Cocaine
Blameworthy
5.03
(1.37)
4.64
(1.52)
Use
Harm
5.11
(1.32)
4.69
(1.43)
Written
Punishment
2.58
(0.98)
2.23
(0.93)
Percentage not a crime
16.6%
24.7%
Blameworthy
4.93
(1.58)
4.71
(1.49)
Harm
5.08
(1.34)
4.77
(1.43)
Video
Punishment
2.66
(1.00)
2.34
(0.97)
Politician,
Percentage not a crime
14.6%
21.8%
Handshake
with Child
Blameworthy
4.98
(1.52)
4.58
(1.56)
Molester
Harm
5.03
(1.43)
4.71
(1.45)
Written
Punishment
2.66
(1.00)
2.29
(0.94)
Percentage not a crime
16.3%
21.4%
Note. Means (standard deviations in parentheses). Blameworthiness and harmfulness were rated
on 6-point scales. Punishment was on a 4-point scale. The proportion of respondents choosing the
lowest punishment option, “It should not be possible to punish him; this should not be a crime,”
is reported in the bottom row for each scenario.

There were very few other significant effects in this first analysis. It was
slightly less blameworthy to write a story about or make a deepfake of a
politician than an everyday person; though, here, whether the person was a
154 The analyses took the form of mixed ANOVA tests with labeling as a between-subjects factor
and politician (versus person) and video (versus written) as within-subjects factors. There were significant
effects on each of the three dependent variables for whether the content was a deepfake video.
Blameworthiness: F(1, 555) = 4.05, p < 0.05 η2 = 0.01. Harm: F(1, 555) = 6.28, p < 0.05 η2 = 0.01.
Punishment: F(1, 555) = 18.05, p < 0.001 η2 = 0.03.
155 Blameworthiness: F(1, 555) = 7.58, p < 0.01 η2 = 0.01. Harm: F(1, 555) = 9.89, p < 0.01
η2 = 0.02. Punishment: F(1, 555) = 23.75, p < 0.001 η2 = 0.04. There was an interaction effect, by which
labeling reduced blameworthiness more for written content, though labeling was also significant for
video. Interaction: F(1, 555) = 5.76, p < 0.05 η2 = 0.01. Written: F(1, 557) = 13.05, p < 0.001 η2 = 0.02.
Video: F(1, 555) = 3.87, p = 0.05 η2 = 0.01. The interactions on harm and punishment were not
significant.
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politician was confounded with the type of morally questionable conduct
depicted.156 Whether the content was video or written mattered less for
punishment in the politician case than it did for the everyday person, though
the base rate was high: more than 85% of people wanted to criminalize the
unlabeled politician video.157
Two additional scenarios concerned everyday people. In one, our
protagonist makes a deepfake of his friend calling herself a jerk.158 This selfinsult variant was viewed as less blameworthy, less harmful, and deserving
of less punishment than the default cocaine scenario but was still generally
criminalized (see Table 5).159 Comparing labeled and unlabeled self-insult
condition, labeling again helped.160
The second everyday-person scenario described our protagonist
running a science-enthusiast website. As part of this website, they created a
video of a scientist describing their own life and accomplishments. This was
intended to push the boundaries of deepfake harm by making the video as
inoffensive as possible. Though this was viewed as less problematic on each
measure than the default cocaine video,161 most people still sought to
criminalize it (see Table 5). Comparing labeled and unlabeled scientist
condition, labeling again helped.162 In a further variant, the scientist in
question was either described as having died ten years earlier or having just
recently retired; participants in the attitudinal condition saw one variant or
the other of this vignette. This was intended to keep constant the approximate
recency of the scientist⎯the scientist is not Newton or Einstein and also not
still active⎯while manipulating whether the scientist is still alive, a factor

F(1, 555) = 6.70, p = 0.01 η2 = 0.01.
Interaction F(1, 555) = 10.78, p < 0.001 η2 = 0.02. Politician F(1, 557) = 0.49, ns. Person: F(1,
555) = 31.76, p < 0.001 η2 = 0.05.
158 This was inspired by a scene in Scrubs. In that scene, the protagonist fantasizes about a recently
met and annoying character saying, “I’m a tool. I’m a tool. I’m a tool, tool, tool, an unbelievably annoying
tool.” Scrubs: My First Day (ABC television broadcast Oct. 2, 2001) (transcript available at
https://scrubs.fandom.com/wiki/My_First_Day_transcript [https://perma.cc/MJ8G-CFE4]).
159 Mixed ANOVA tests were conducted with the cocaine and self-insult vignettes as within-subjects
factors and labeling as a between-subjects factor. There was a significant effect of scenario on each of the
three measures. Blameworthy: F(1, 560) = 28.79, p < 0.001 η2 = 0.049. Harm: F(1, 560) = 66.31,
p < 0.001 η2 = 0.106. Punishment: F(1, 560) = 74.13, p < 0.001 η2 = 0.117.
160 Blameworthy: F(1, 560) = 6.52, p < 0.05 η2 = 0.012. Harm: F(1, 560) = 7.02, p < 0.01 η2 = 0.012.
Punishment: F(1, 560) = 17.59, p < 0.001 η2 = 0.03.
161 Mixed ANOVA tests were conducted with the cocaine and self-insult vignettes as within-subjects
factors and labeling as a between-subjects factor. There was a significant main effect of scenario on each
of the three measures. Blameworthy: F(1, 561) = 44.57, p < 0.001 η2 = 0.074. Harm: F(1, 561) = 132.97,
p < 0.001 η2 = 0.192. Punishment: F(1, 561) = 95.64, p < 0.001 η2 = 0.146.
162 Blameworthy: F(1, 561) = 7.47, p < ).01 η2 = 0.013. Harm: F(1, 561) = 6.64, p < 0.05 η2 = 0.012.
Punishment: F(1, 561) = 11.34, p < 0.001 η2 = 0.02.
156
157
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which matters a great deal elsewhere in privacy law.163 This manipulation
had no effect on any measure, so the Table 5 analysis combines these two
conditions.164
TABLE 5: REACTIONS TO FURTHER NONCONSENSUAL DEEPFAKES
Unlabeled
Labeled
Blameworthy
4.82
(1.49)
4.44
(1.61)
Harm
4.70
(1.43)
4.36
(1.56)
Self-Insult
Punishment
2.41
(0.97)
2.11
(0.92)
Percentage not a crime
19.9%
28.5%
Blameworthy
4.70
(1.54)
4.31
(1.69)
Harm
4.35
(1.61)
4.04
(1.75)
Scientist (Living and
Dead Combined)
Punishment
2.29
(1.00)
2.11
(0.97)
Percentage not a crime
25.5%
31.7%
Blameworthy
5.06
(1.48)
4.74
(1.54)
Harm
5.12
(1.34)
4.87
(1.38)
Politician, Terror
Endorsement
Punishment
2.80
(1.02)
2.48
(0.99)
Percentage not a crime
13.8%
18.1%
Note. Means (standard deviations in parentheses). Blameworthiness and harmfulness were
rated on 6-point scales. Punishment was on a 4-point scale. The percent choosing the lowest
punishment option, “It should not be possible to punish him; this should not be a crime,” is
reported in the bottom row for each scenario.

For everyday people, then, there is substantial opposition to deepfakes
of all sorts. There is substantially less opposition to more satirical deepfakes
than ones depicting obviously blameworthy conduct (illegal drug use), and
this difference is further helped by labeling. But most participants still sought
to prohibit even the most harmless deepfake that we could design⎯the
scientist saying true facts about their own life.
Because of the emphasis in the literature on election interference, and
the California and Texas statutes specifically targeting deepfakes of
politicians,165 we included a second scenario that misrepresented a politician
behaving in a morally questionable way. In this vignette, the politician is

163 See, e.g., Natalie M. Banta, Death and Privacy in the Digital Age, 94 N.C. L. REV. 927, 935
(2016) (“[P]rivacy torts are generally available to protect privacy during life; however, the majority of
courts do not allow this right to extend beyond death.” (footnotes omitted)); Warren v. Colvin, 744 F.3d
841, 843−44 (2d Cir. 2014) (“[Plaintiff] correctly asserts that deceased individuals generally do not enjoy
rights under the Privacy Act.”).
164 A between-subjects ANOVA using alive versus dead and labeled versus not as factors found no
significant effect of whether the scientist was alive on any measure. Blameworthy: F(1, 559) = 2.79, ns.
Harm: F(1, 559) = 1.03, ns. Punishment: F(1, 559) = 0.12, ns.
165 See supra note 10; supra notes 121–126 and accompanying text.
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represented as “saying they support a known terrorist organization.”166
Compared to the politician-handshake case, this was viewed as more morally
blameworthy and deserving of more punishment, but not significantly more
harmful (see Table 5).167 Comparing labeled and unlabeled politician
endorsement condition, labeling again helped.168
Finally, there were two additional politician scenarios. As with the
scientist, here we sought to present less overtly harmful fact patterns. For
one, the video of the politician told people where their local polling places
were. The study was conducted in advance of the 2020 general election, so
this scenario was timely. The other scenario was of a politician singing an
unspecified silly song.
In each case, we manipulated whether the politician had given general
consent to produce the deepfake. For the polling-place scenario, the
consensual vignette began, “Imagine a state-level politician has invited her
constituents to make and share videos of her telling people the location of
their local polling place.” The consensual version of the silly song vignette
was similar, “Imagine a state-level politician has invited her constituents to
make and share silly videos of her for her campaign.” Each participant in an
attitudinal condition received either the consensual or nonconsensual version
of each of these vignettes.
This consent was not as explicit and specific as it could have been. In
general, one could easily imagine a politician consenting to have their image
used in personalized get-out-the-vote messaging. Former President Barack
Obama, for instance, phone-banked on behalf of Joseph Biden in the 2020
general election.169 It would not be that great a stretch to imagine him
working with the national party committee to produce personalized
messages. A former president, however, likely would have been leery of
166

If this scenario seems extreme, recall that Representative Peter King (R-N.Y.) endorsed the Irish
Republican Army. In 1985, he said: “If civilians are killed in an attack on a military installation, it is
certainly regrettable, but I will not morally blame the I.R.A. for it.” Elspeth Reeve, Peter King Supported
the IRA Before Hunting for Terrorists, ATLANTIC (Mar. 9, 2011) https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/
archive/2011/03/peter-king-loved-terrorism-when-it-was-done-irish-people/348691/ [https://perma.cc/
9DSZ-HLW6].
167 Mixed ANOVA tests were conducted with the handshake and terror vignettes as within-subjects
factors and labeling as a between-subjects factor. There was a significant effect of scenario on two of the
measures, and a nonsignificant trend on perceived harmfulness. Blameworthy: F(1, 557) = 4.15, p < 0.05
η2 = 0.007. Harm: F(1, 557) = 3.34, p = 0.07 η2 = 0.006. Punishment: F(1, 557) = 16.93, p < 0.001
η2 = 0.03.
168 Blameworthy: F(1, 557) = 5.61, p < 0.05 η2 = 0.01. Harm: F(1, 557) = 7.61, p < 0.01 η2 = 0.013.
Punishment: F(1, 557) = 18.33, p < 0.001 η2 = 0.032.
169 Sirena Bergman, Voter Shares Adorable Video of Obama Chatting to Her New Baby on the Phone
While Canvassing for Biden, INDY100 (Nov. 1, 2020, 2:45 PM). https://www.indy100.com/article/
obama-phone-banking-biden-viral-video-pennsylvania-election-9724055
[https://perma.cc/M3HFQKMB].
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granting their supporters as broad a license to make deepfake videos as did
our hypothetical politician. The president would presumably want some
editorial control to ensure quality and appropriateness. Here, we glossed over
that issue.
TABLE 6: REACTIONS TO CONSENSUAL ATTITUDINAL POLITICIAN DEEPFAKES
Unlabeled
Labeled
Blameworthy
4.49
(1.66)
4.13
(1.77)
Harm
4.26
(1.74)
3.92
(1.80)
Polling Place, No
Consent
Punishment
2.39
(1.08)
2.07
(0.94)
Percentage not a crime
26.1%
31.6%
Blameworthy
4.05
(1.84)
3.48
(1.83)
Harm
3.78
(1.87)
3.32
(1.85)
Polling Place,
Consent
Punishment
2.07
(1.12)
1.84
(1.00)
Percentage not a crime
43.4%
50.0%
Blameworthy
4.65
(1.67)
4.24
(1.73)
Harm
4.41
(1.63)
3.91
(1.78)
Silly Song, No
Consent
Punishment
2.23
(0.99)
2.09
(1.02)
Percentage not a crime
27.8%
34.4%
Blameworthy
3.74
(1.90)
3.57
(1.83)
Harm
3.83
(1.84)
3.54
(1.77)
Silly Song, Consent
Punishment
2.01
(1.05)
1.90
(0.95)
Percentage not a crime
42.4%
43.6%
Note. Means (standard deviations in parentheses). Blameworthiness and harmfulness were
rated on 6-point scales. Punishment was on a 4-point scale. The percent choosing the lowest
punishment option, “It should not be possible to punish him; this should not be a crime,” is
reported in the bottom row for each scenario.

As can be seen in Table 6, consent greatly reduced the perceived
wrongfulness and harmfulness, as well as the desire to punish, for both
scenarios.170 Labeling was somewhat effective at alleviating concerns in the
polling-place scenario, though the effect was not significant on every

170 Separate ANOVA tests were conducted for the polling-place and silly-song vignettes with the
same design. Both consent and labeling were between-subjects factors. For each, there was a strong effect
of consent.
Polling place: Blameworthy: F(1, 556) = 13.32, p < 0.001 η2 = 0.023. Harm: F(1, 556) = 12.18,
p < 0.001 η2 = 0.021. Punishment: F(1, 556) = 9.91, p < 0.01 η2 = 0.018.
Silly Song: Blameworthy: F(1, 559) = 27.09, p < .001 η2 = 0.023. Harm: F(1, 559) = 10.27, p < 0.001
η2 = 0.021. Punishment: F(1, 559) = 5.80, p < 0.05 η2 = 0.018.
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measure for the silly-song scenario.171 Nevertheless, people were still often
willing to criminalize these deepfakes.
As with the consensual personal-use scenario, the consensual votingannouncement and silly-song videos also increased the proportion of people
viewing the deepfakes as not wrongful at all. The consensual voting
announcement was viewed as minimally blameworthy by 18.6% of
respondents (11.4% for nonconsensual), and the consensual song video by
20.1% (9.7% for nonconsensual).
Figure 1 summarizes the main cross-scenario differences by showing
the perceived harmfulness of each. The overall differences are stark. The
consensual scenarios attract much lower harmfulness scores, and the
nonconsensual pornographic videos attract particularly high scores.
Attitudinal deepfakes worry a great many people, but this worry is reduced
in the cases that are more satirical or somewhat harmless and by labeling.
Pornographic deepfakes, however, are seen as very harmful by almost
everyone. Labeling has a minimal effect⎯generally no effect⎯and no
amount of variation in the scenarios matters much, even the ones that did not
depict nudity.
The role of consent in these scenarios is somewhat unexpected. Consent
always helped substantially, but it did not reduce the perceived harmfulness
to nothing. There could be many reasons for this. For one, perhaps
participants were not clear on the scope of consent⎯did the deepfake subject
truly understand and agree to what actually happened? We comment further
on the psychology of consent in this context in Part III.

Polling place: Blameworthy: F(1, 556) = 9.80, p < 0.01 η2 = 0.017. Harm: F(1, 556) = 6.77,
p < 0.05 η2 = 0.012. Punishment: F(1, 556) = 10.16, p < 0.01 η2 = 0.018.
Silly Song: Blameworthy: F(1, 559) = 3.60, p = 0.06 η2 = 0.017. Harm: F(1, 559) = 7.20, p < 0.01
η2 = 0.012. Punishment: F(1, 559) = 2.11 p = 0.15 η2 = 0.018.
171
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FIGURE 1: PERCEIVED HARMFULNESS OF EACH TYPE OF DEEPFAKE
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C. Views on Deepfake Policies and Gender
Following the vignettes, these same participants were asked a series of
policy-style questions. These questions explicitly defined deepfake videos
and asked participants to think about the kinds of deepfake videos discussed
in the scenarios they just read.172 For example, in the unlabeled pornographic
condition, participants were told:
Think about pornographic deepfake videos that show people saying and doing
things they did not say or do. These are the types of videos referred to earlier in
the study. So these are videos that include people nude, having sex, or
engaged in sexual activities. How harmful do you think this kind of video is if
the viewers think the video is real?

Given that participants had just finished working through the scenarios
reported in the preceding section, it was likely that these instructions were
interpreted in terms of the use cases they had read.
The first question asked participants to make an overall assessment of
harm for deepfake videos in their category on a 0–100 scale. As can be seen
in Figure 2, pornographic videos were viewed as significantly more harmful
than attitudinal videos; additionally, labeled videos⎯videos the viewer
would know were false⎯were less harmful than unlabeled ones.173 There
was also a marginally significant interaction between attitudinal versus
pornographic and labeling.174 Consistent with the scenario results, labeling
reduced perceived harmfulness more for the attitudinal scenarios.175

172

The following definition was used:

A deepfake video is a realistic-looking video that has been edited to depict someone saying or
doing something they never said or did. In a deepfake video, a person from one photo or video is
inserted into another video. These videos can imitate people’s faces and voices so well that they
look and sound real.
173 ANOVA tests were conducted looking at the factors pornographic versus attitudinal, labeled
versus unlabeled, and male versus female. There were significant main effects for labeled, F(1,
1111) = 71.54, p < 0.001 η2 = 0.061, pornographic, F(1, 1111) = 41.44, p < 0.001 η2 = 0.036, and gender
F(1, 1111) = 11.26, p < 0.001 η2 = 0.01.
174 F(1, 1111) = 3.30. p = 07 η2 = 0.003.
175 Attitudinal F(1, 548) = 49.27, p < 0.001 η2 = 0.082. Pornographic: F(1, 563) = 23.68, p < 0.001
η2 = 0.040.
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FIGURE 2: PERCEPTIONS OF HARM FOR EACH TYPE OF DEEPFAKE SCENARIO BY GENDER
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There was also a significant effect of gender⎯women thought that
deepfake videos were more harmful⎯but this was entirely driven by the
pornographic deepfakes; there was a gender effect in the pornographic
condition but not the attitudinal.176 This gender pattern was also observed in
the main pornographic and attitudinal scenarios. The female participants
viewed the baseline pornographic scenario as more blameworthy, harmful,
and deserving of punishment than the male participants did. However, there
were no significant effects of gender for the baseline attitudinal scenario.177
Previous research has observed that support for criminalizing nonconsensual

176 There was a significant interaction between gender and pornographic versus attitudinal. F(1,
1111) = 10.14, p < 0.001 η2 = 0.009. A simple effects analysis revealed that there was a significant effect
of gender for the pornographic conditions, F(1, 563) = 22.96, p < 0.001 η2 = 0.039, but not for the
attitudinal conditions, F(1, 548) = 0.01 ns.
177 Pornographic: Blameworthy: F(1, 571) = 10.24, p < 0.001 η2 = 0.018, Male (M = 5.21,
SD = 1.40), Female (M = 5.55, SD = 1.11). Harm: F(1, 571) = 13.71, p < 0.001 η2 = 0.023, Male
(M = 5.23, SD = 1.32), Female (M = 5.59, SD = 1.00). Punishment: F(1, 571) = 9.05, p < 0.01
η2 = 0.016, Male (M = 2.86, SD = 0.97), Female (M = 3.10, SD = 0.89).
Attitudinal (cocaine): Blameworthy: F(1, 559) = 1.36 ns, Male (M = 4.77, SD = 1.46), Female
(M = 4.91, SD = 1.46). Harm: F(1, 559) = 2.70.101 ns, Male (M = 4.81, SD = 1.39), Female (M = 5.00,
SD = 1.37). Punishment: F(1, 559) = 0.570.45 ns, Male (M = 2.37, SD = 1.01), Female (M = 2.43,
SD = 0.93).
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pornography also differs by gender,178 so it is not surprising that we observed
this pattern of gender difference here.
This study did not include extensive measures of study participants’
individual differences. The basic demographic questions on political
orientation and educational attainment did not significantly relate to
perceptions of overall harmfulness in any condition.179
Participants were also asked to rate the extent to which they thought
each kind of video would cause particular kinds of harm. Specifically, they
were asked to rate whether the videos would interfere with the video
subjects’ prospects for employment, cause them emotional harm, hurt their
reputation, or damage their election chances. On each of these questions,
participants rating pornographic scenarios assigned higher scores (between
5 and 5.5 out of 6 for each question) than did those participants rating
nonpornographic scenarios (between 4.7 and 5).180 Based on their responses,
participants expected labeling to help somewhat on employment and,
nonsignificantly, on election chances, but labeling had no effect on
emotional harm or reputation.181 Further, female participants thought all
deepfake scenarios were more likely to cause these negative effects than did
male participants.182

178 See, e.g., Sarah Esther Lageson, Suzy McElrath & Krissinda Ellen Palmer, Gendered Public
Support for Criminalizing “Revenge Porn,” 14 FEMINIST CRIMINOLOGY 560, 577 (2019) (reporting
greater “support for criminalizing nonconsensual pornography among” those “respondents who identify
as women”).
179 These results are available from the authors upon request.
180 ANOVA tests were conducted looking at the factors pornographic versus attitudinal, labeled
versus unlabeled, and male versus female. These are the effects for the main effect of pornographic versus
attitudinal.
Employment: Attitudinal (M = 4.72, SD = 1.43), Pornographic (M = 5.3, SD = 1.26). F(1,
1119) = 48.26, p < 0.001 η2 = 0.04.
Emotional harm: Attitudinal (M = 4.89, SD = 1.35), Pornographic (M = 5.4, SD = 1.15). F(1,
1119) = 43.79, p < 0.001 η2 = 0.04.
Reputation: Attitudinal (M = 4.93, SD = 1.35), Pornographic (M = 5.38, SD = 1.22). F(1,
1119) = 32.12, p < 0.001 η2 = 0.03.
Election chances: Attitudinal (M = 4.92, SD = 1.34), Pornographic (M = 5.38, SD = 1.20). F(1,
1119) = 33.7, p < 0.001 η2 = 0.03.
181 Employment: Unlabeled (M = 5.13, SD = 1.33), Labeled (M = 4.91, SD = 1.42). F(1,
1119) = 8.05, p < 0.01 η2 = 0.01.
Election chances: Unlabeled (M = 5.23, SD = 1.25), Labeled (M = 5.09, SD = 1.34). F(1,
1119) = 3.46+ η2 = 0.
182 Employment: Male (M = 4.84, SD = 1.48), Female (M = 5.18, SD = 1.26). F(1, 1119) = 14.94,
p < 0.001 η2 = 0.01.
Emotional harm: Male (M = 4.99, SD = 1.33), Female (M = 5.3, SD = 1.21). F(1, 1119) = 13.47,
p < 0.001 η2 = 0.01.
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Overall, then, participants felt that deepfake scenarios were quite
harmful. This was especially true for pornographic scenarios and unlabeled
attitudinal scenarios, but even labeled attitudinal scenarios were believed to
cause harm (64 points out of 100) (see Figure 2). In terms of the kinds of
harm that might result from these scenarios, people endorsed all of them to
a high degree (approximately 5 out of 6 on all measures across all
conditions). Deepfake views are also gendered, as women believe that
pornographic deepfakes are more harmful than men do, though even men
rate them as extremely harmful.
D. Follow-Up Study: Deepfakes and the Civil–Criminal Divide
Some states that have laws addressing nonconsensual pornography
allow for both government-administered criminal punishment as well as
private civil lawsuits.183 One limitation of the primary study is that it focused
on the criminal justice system. Participants who sought to punish deepfakes
could only do so by suggesting a criminal sanction; there was no civil
alternative. This design may have obscured a willingness among our
participants to impose a less-than-criminal (or at least different-thancriminal) punishment.
Based on the results of the primary study, there is reason to think that
participants would have been inclined to allow for both civil and criminal
remedies in most cases. In general, criminal law is intended to punish
morally blameworthy conduct, whereas the civil system is intended to
compensate victims for wrongful injuries.184 The questions in the first study,
asking participants to rate the moral blameworthiness of the acts and their
potential for causing harm, implicitly reflect these two related goals. Prior
work has shown that people’s preference for retributive punishment tracks
the perceived wrongfulness of a transgression, whereas preference for
compensatory damages is affected primarily by the amount of harm caused

Reputation: Male (M = 5.00, SD = 1.36), Female (M = 5.31, SD = 1.22). F(1, 1119) = 13.74,
p < 0.001 η2 = 0.01.
Election chances: Male (M = 5.01, SD = 1.36), Female (M = 5.29, SD = 1.22). F(1, 1119) = 11.36,
p < 0.001 η2 = 0.01.
183 This may be in the form of two separate statutes or one statute. For example, Colorado has
separate criminal and civil statutes. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-21-1401–1409 (West 2019) (providing
“Civil Remedies for Unauthorized Disclosure of Intimate Images”); id. §§ 18-7-107–108 (criminal
statute). Vermont has a single statute that provides both criminal penalties and a civil cause of action. VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 2606 (West 2015).
184 See OLIVER W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 50–51 (Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1881).
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by the transgression.185 Based on the blameworthiness and harm ratings from
the first study, therefore, one would expect people to be seeking to both
punish the video creator criminally as well as allow for civil compensatory
recovery by the deepfake target.
Nevertheless, the first study does not provide firm evidence on whether
people would have a strong preference between the civil and criminal
systems. We therefore conducted a second study to specifically answer the
question of whether people would prefer to deal with deepfake wrongs
through the civil regime, the criminal regime, or both. This study employed
only a subset of the scenarios employed in the first study, allowing us to ask
this more complicated question without exhausting participant attention.
A sample of American adults was recruited in January 2021 by
CloudResearch, another online survey firm with an established panel.186 The
demographics of the sample were set to match U.S. Census proportions on
the dimensions of age and sex, but race, ethnicity, and educational attainment
could freely vary.187 This produced a sample that was somewhat more white,
less Hispanic, and more educated than in the first study. The sample was,
however, as politically neutral and gender- and age-balanced as the
representative data collection in the primary study. Full demographics are
reported in Appendix A. The final sample contained 395 individuals.188 The
changes in sample size and provider were aimed at reducing the cost of the
survey.
The procedure for this study mirrored that of the first. After completing
the demographic questions, participants were told that they would be asked
to rate four scenarios. To test a range of different possibilities, we set up four
scenarios: one pornographic (friend video), one attitudinal and defamatory
(cocaine video), one attitudinal and non-defamatory (living-scientist video),
185

John M. Darley, Lawrence M. Solan, Matthew B. Kugler & Joseph Sanders, Doing Wrong
Without Creating Harm, 7 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 30, 41–43 (2010) (presenting an experimental
study showing that more blameworthy states of mind produced higher punitive damages and proposed
prison terms, whereas greater realized harm produced higher compensatory damages); Joseph Sanders,
Matthew B. Kugler, Lawrence M. Solan & John M. Darley, Must Torts Be Wrongs? An Empirical
Perspective, 49 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1, 25–27 (2014) (presenting an empirical study showing that
people were willing to assign compensatory, but generally not punitive, damages to innocent agents who
caused harm).
186 See The Easiest Way to Find Participants for Academic Research, CLOUDRESEARCH,
https://www.cloudresearch.com/industries/students-universities/ [https://perma.cc/F8SZ-S95X].
187 Recall that the only major demographic effect in the first study was on gender, which is still
representative here.
188 As in the first study, inattentive participants were screened from the final sample based on two
criteria. First, participants who did not give the appropriate response to an attention check question—a
question asking participants to give a particular response—or a CAPTCHA item were unable to complete
the study. Second, participants were screened from the final sample if they finished the study in less than
one-third of the time taken by the median participant.
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and one defamatory and political (politician-terror-endorsement video).189
Participants saw these four scenarios in a random order. As in the first study,
participants were told that the protagonist, Will, had either labeled all his
videos as fake or that he had done nothing to show the videos were not
genuine. Following each scenario, the key new question asked:
How, if at all, should it be possible to punish Will for making and distributing
the video?
(A) Will should not be punished.
(B) [Deepfake subject] should be able to sue Will, have the video taken
down, and get money in compensation for any harm they/she might
suffer from the video.
(C) It should be a crime for Will to do this, meaning that the
government should be able to prosecute him. This might result in
having the video taken down, a fine, and/or a prison sentence.
(D) Both B and C (Will may be sued by [deepfake subject] and be
criminally prosecuted).

Both the civil and criminal options here left open the possibility of a
remedial injunction: removing the video. The main differences between the
two are who is bringing the action (the state or the victim) and whether a
prison sentence is possible. For simplicity, participants were not asked to
give a magnitude judgment for either the criminal or civil punishment.
TABLE 7: PREFERENCE FOR CIVIL AND CRIMINAL REMEDIES FOR NONCONSENSUAL DEEPFAKES
Pornographic,
Friend
Labeled
Not

Cocaine Use,
Friend
Labeled
Not

Scientist, Living

Labeled
Not
No
3.6%
0.5%
3.1%
0.5%
12.2%
6.6%
Punishment
Civil
17.3%
15.2%
26.5%
18.2%
33.2%
20.7%
Punishment
Criminal
8.7%
10.1%
8.7%
10.1%
10.7%
13.1%
Punishment
Both Civil
70.4%
74.2%
61.7%
71.2%
43.9%
59.6%
and Criminal
Note. Values reflect the percentage of participants choosing each punishment option.

Politician, Terror
Endorsement
Labeled
Not
7.1%

3.0%

18.9%

13.6%

12.8%

10.6%

61.2%

72.7%

As can be seen in Table 7, participants generally wished to allow for
both civil and criminal punishments. Providing participants with the option
of a civil remedy had the effect of slightly lowering the percentage of
189 The living-scientist scenario was modified slightly to say that the scientist was currently
employed at a major university (rather than to have retired recently).

656

116:611 (2021)

Deepfake Privacy

participants opting for criminalization and substantially lowered the
percentage opting for no punishment as compared to the first study. In the
unlabeled pornographic case, for instance, 92.7% of the respondents in the
first study wished to criminalize the conduct, and 7.3% wished to assign no
punishment. Here, 84.3% wished to criminalize (criminal punishment or
both civil and criminal), and only 0.5% wished to assign no punishment, with
the rest offering an exclusive civil remedy. There was a similar pattern for
the labeled video of the scientist. In the first study, 69.6% of the sample
wished to criminalize the conduct, and 30.4% wished to assign no
punishment.190 Here, 54.6% wished to criminalize (criminal punishment or
both civil and criminal), and only 12.2% wished to assign no punishment,
with the rest offering an exclusive civil remedy.
These results suggest that a small portion of those wishing to punish the
creation and dissemination of deepfake videos would be satisfied with a civil
rather than criminal remedy. Comparing the ratings here to those from the
first study shows that the decline in desire to criminalize is, on average, 8.8
percentage points.191 Conversely, the portion of the sample opting for no
punishment also declines sharply, with only a single participant in the
pornographic unlabeled condition opting to forgo any remedy.192
E. Follow-Up Study: Explicit Comparison to Traditional
Nonconsensual Pornography
The prior two studies have shown substantial condemnation of
pornographic deepfakes, whether labeled as fake or not, but they have not
allowed an explicit comparison to traditional nonconsensual pornography
where a picture or video showing someone’s nude body is shared without
their permission. Since so many states have laws prohibiting nonconsensual
pornography, it would be helpful to know whether people view deepfake
pornography as being on par with this already-regulated practice.
A short follow-up study was therefore conducted in July 2021. The
sample for this study was also recruited by CloudResearch. The
demographics of the sample were set to match U.S. Census proportions on
the dimensions of age and sex, but race, ethnicity, and educational attainment
190 Recall that this is the living-scientist variant, not the combination of the dead and living conditions
(Schrodinger’s Scientist) reported in supra Table 5.
191 The Study 1 values are reported in supra Tables 2, 4, and 5, except for the living-scientist scenario
(69.6% for labeled, 75.6% for unlabeled). Study 2 compared like scenario to like scenario, combining the
criminal-punishment and both-civil-and-criminal-punishment options: 83.73 – 74.96 = 8.76, which
rounds to 8.8.
192 It is somewhat misleading to report the average for this decline (11.7 points), given the restricted
range. Specifically, the average is greater than the small percentage of respondents opting against
criminalization in the first study’s pornographic condition.

657

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

could freely vary. Again, this produced a sample that was reasonably but not
perfectly representative. Full demographics are reported in Appendix A. The
final sample contained 417 individuals.193
The procedure for this study mirrored that of the first and second. After
completing the demographic questions, participants were told that they
would be asked to rate two scenarios. These were a modified version of the
friend deepfake and a comparable traditional nonconsensual-pornography
scenario. Participants saw these two scenarios in a random order. As in the
second study, participants had the option of punishing the actor civilly or
criminally if they so wished. They also rated the blameworthiness and
harmfulness of the video.
The changes in the deepfake condition were relatively minor. The
deepfake subject was described as a former romantic partner rather than as a
friend, and the deepfake video was of the subject masturbating rather than
having sexual intercourse.194 The deepfake creator was said to have made and
posted the video after the end of the romantic relationship. To maintain
consistency with the other scenario, the video was not said to be labeled as
fake. In the traditional nonconsensual-pornography condition, a woman,
Mary, had sent her romantic partner, James, a video of herself masturbating.
James was said to have requested this video and promised to keep it private.
Again, the former partner posted the video online after the breakup. This
condition was intended to fall within the scope of many nonconsensualpornography laws by explicitly noting the expectation of confidentiality.195
The text of both scenarios is included in Appendix C.

193 As in the first study, inattentive participants were screened from the final sample based on two
criteria. First, participants who did not give the appropriate response to an attention check question—a
question asking participants to give a particular response—or a CAPTCHA item were unable to complete
the study. Second, participants were screened from the final sample if they finished the study in less than
one-third of the time taken by the median participant.
194 The switch to masturbation was done to avoid any question of joint creation in the traditional
nonconsensual-pornography case.
195 See supra notes 108–113 and accompanying text for a discussion of state-by-state variations in
nonconsensual-pornography provisions.
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TABLE 8: PREFERENCE FOR CIVIL AND CRIMINAL REMEDIES
Deepfake of Ex-Partner

Blameworthy
Harmful

5.51
5.48

(1.13)
(1.14)

Traditional Nonconsensual
Pornography of Ex-Partner
5.35
(1.25)
5.49
(1.06)

No Punishment
5.8%
7.2%
Civil Punishment
20.6%
26.6%
Criminal Punishment
12.9%
12.0%
Both Civil and
60.7%
54.2%
Criminal
Note. For blameworthiness and harm: means (standard deviations in parentheses). On the
punishment question, each row is reporting the proportion of the sample choosing that option.

As can be seen in Table 8, the deepfake and traditional nonconsensualpornographic video were both viewed as highly morally blameworthy.196
Posting the deepfake video was viewed as slightly more blameworthy,
though, given the high scores, this difference may not be practically
important.197 There was no significant difference in the perceived
harmfulness of each, though, again, both means are quite high.198 In terms of
desired remedy, the median participant would have allowed for both civil
and criminal enforcement for each. Approximately equal proportions of
participants wished to allow for civil and criminal remedies in each case.
Slightly more participants wanted to allow for criminal sanctions in the
deepfake case than in the traditional nonconsensual-pornography case,
however.199 Overall, there is somewhat less reliance on criminal remedies in
this study than in the previous one. This may be due to using an ex-romantic
partner as the deepfake subject rather than a friend or stranger.
Our participants, therefore, tended to view deepfake pornography as on
par with traditional nonconsensual pornography. Compared to traditional
nonconsensual pornography, creating and posting deepfake pornography
196 The within-subjects ANOVA analyzing the harm and blameworthiness measures included order
as a factor. There was a main effect of order on both measures. Blameworthiness: F(1, 415) = 4.23,
p = 0.04 η2 = 0.01. Harm: F(1, 415) = 5.91, p = 0.015 η2 = 0.014. In each case, this was due to both
scenarios being rated as worse when the traditional nonconsensual-pornography scenario came first. This
is odd given that the traditional nonconsensual-pornography scenario was rated as less blameworthy in
both orders; we might expect that when the worse-rated scenario is shown first, participants will be primed
to rate the next scenario as more harmful and blameworthy, but the opposite occurred. There was no
significant interaction between order and scenario condition (deepfake or not) on either measure.
Blameworthiness: F(1, 415) = 0.10, p = 0.753 η2 = 0.000. Harm: F(1, 415) = 2.76, p = 0.097 η2 = 0.007.
197 F(1, 415) = 9.23, p = 0.003 η2 = 0.022.
198 F(1, 415) = 0.07, p = 0.785 η2 = 0.000.
199 This difference is significant χ2 (1, N = 417) = 5.48, p = 0.019.
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was viewed as marginally more morally blameworthy, approximately as
harmful, and slightly more likely to be deserving the attention of the criminal
justice system. It is unclear why some participants appear to have viewed
deepfakes as worse. This may be a result of victim-blaming in the traditional
nonconsensual-pornography condition, but it could also be due to many other
factors. For instance, greater effort is involved in fabricating a fake video
rather than posting an already-available real one.
III. FITTING DEEPFAKE ATTITUDES INTO THE LAW
The consistent message of these surveys is that people overwhelmingly
find pornographic and attitudinal deepfakes to be very harmful. Clearly
labeling the deepfake as fake mitigated the harm for attitudinal deepfakes but
not for pornographic ones. And respondents were nearly unanimous in
wishing to allow for civil punishment, criminal punishment, or both of those
making pornographic deepfakes. Our final study shows that people were
inclined to treat pornographic deepfakes much like traditional nonconsensual
pornography.
Thinking back to the relatively limited legal options for deepfake
subjects discussed in Section I.C, there is a remarkable divergence between
the moral expectations of our sample and the remedies available under
privacy tort law. Our participants believe that pornographic deepfakes cause
substantial injuries. These videos were believed to affect employment
chances, emotional well-being, and general reputation.200 Participants are
almost definitionally correct in their belief that depiction in these deepfakes
causes harm to a person’s dignity: if people believe something is
demeaning⎯“[c]ausing someone to lose their dignity and the respect of
others”201⎯then it is. These findings would therefore substantially support
the argument that being unwillingly featured in a pornographic deepfake is
“highly offensive to a reasonable person.” But even success on this argument
would be of only limited help; the other elements of each of the key privacy
torts of intrusion upon seclusion and public disclosure of private facts are not
satisfied.202
Defamation and false light claims are also not helpful in supporting the
moral intuitions of the sample. The survey respondents rated labeled
deepfake videos—especially pornographic ones—as incredibly harmful. Yet
200

See supra note 180 and accompanying text.
Demeaning, OXFORD LEXICO DICTIONARY, https://www.lexico.com/en/definition/demeaning
[https://perma.cc/Q5WT-LGG3]. The definition from Merriam-Webster is similar: “damaging or
lowering the character, status, or reputation of someone or something.” Demeaning, MERRIAM-WEBSTER,
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/demeaning [https://perma.cc/6EB4-FADF].
202 See supra Section I.C.
201
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both causes of action require a falsity,203 and victims will not be able to
pursue either claim when the video is obviously fake, such as when it is
labeled as fake or uploaded to a website dedicated to deepfake videos. This
returns us to our opening example of Kristen Bell. She explained that
labeling a pornographic deepfake of her as fake did not cure her harm; the
issue was that she had not consented.204
Statutory causes of action are similarly unhelpful in most states;
deepfakes are beyond the reach of most current nonconsensual-pornography
statutes.205 But this is likely to be the subject of legislative consideration over
the next several years. This Part, therefore, does two things. First, it attempts
to understand the psychology behind some of the more puzzling findings
from Part II. Second, it considers how the empirical results from Part II
should inform our understanding of the First Amendment’s limitations on
deepfake regulation.
A. Contextualizing Deepfake Punitiveness
Across all scenarios, people were extremely willing to punish those who
made and distributed deepfake videos. Somewhat surprisingly, many survey
respondents viewed as blameworthy and harmful even deepfakes made with
consent or deepfakes that did not create obvious harm, such as a deepfake
depicting a scientist talking about their life’s work or a deepfake depicting a
politician singing a silly song. This Section considers how these puzzling
results of the main study can be understood within two frameworks: moral
psychology and feminist legal scholarship. The moral-psychology approach
will explore how the condemnation of consensual deepfakes may be an
explicable judgment error. The feminist-legal-scholarship approach will
explore how condemnation of consensual deepfakes may be a sensible view
given the bare-bones consent process described in our scenarios.
1. Moral Psychology: From Disgust to Harm
Though it is easy to justify the moral wrongfulness of the core deepfake
cases, it is somewhat harder to explain how a consensual deepfake can be
morally blameworthy. If the problem with a pornographic deepfake is that it

203 This is slightly more complicated in the case of false light, where the accused message merely
needs to convey a false impression. A woman was able to win a false light claim against a pornographic
magazine when it published her (clothed) picture surrounded by lascivious images, because this arguably
implied things about her character. Braun v. Flynt, 726 F.2d 245, 254 (5th Cir. 1984). Nonconsensual,
labeled deepfake creations imply nothing in particular about the character of those depicted, however, so
it would be harder for labeled deepfakes to serve as the basis for a false light claim.
204 Abram, supra note 1.
205 See supra notes 108–112 and accompanying text.
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takes away the agency of the person depicted, then consent should remove
that as a concern.
One possible explanation is that this is a kind of moral-judgment error.
The person believes that deepfakes are bad, perhaps thinking of the
nonconsensual pornographic deepfakes of celebrities. When confronted with
a deepfake that is consensual and nonpornographic, the person may still have
a negative feeling about the deepfake due to cognitive bleed over from the
more common and more distasteful example. If this is occurring, it may be
an example of what is called moral dumbfounding.206 Moral dumbfounding
can generally be defined as “the stubborn and puzzled maintenance of a
judgment without supporting reasons.”207 The quintessential moraldumbfounding study takes something that almost everyone believes is wrong
(cannibalism, incest, or bestiality) and removes by fiat all of the factors that
one would normally use to argue that the conduct is harmful.208 For example,
Professors Jonathan Haidt, Fredrik Björklund, and Scott Murphy asked
survey participants to evaluate a scenario in which a medical research
assistant eats a human cadaver that has been donated to a medical lab and
will be incinerated the next day.209 Moral dumbfounding occurs when people
cannot articulate a reason for why cannibalism is wrong in that context but
still maintain that it is morally objectionable.210 Haidt and colleagues believe
that this type of dumbfounding is common and that it shows that people often
leap from intuitive feelings of disgust to judgments of moral wrongfulness
without stopping to consider coherent philosophical theories of harm.211 A
moral-dumbfounding account of deepfake attitudes would suggest that
people have an intuitive negative reaction to deepfakes generally, based on
a number of factors, and that they fail to sufficiently correct their
understandings when some of those factors are no longer present.
Perhaps contributing to this negative “gut reaction” against the idea of
any deepfake videos is the novelty of the technology. Deepfake technology
is relatively new, and the concept of inserting someone’s face into a video to

206

Cillian McHugh, Marek McGann, Eric R. Igou & Elaine L. Kinsella, Searching for Moral
Dumbfounding: Identifying Measurable Indicators of Moral Dumbfounding, 3 COLLABRA: PSYCH. 1, 1−2
(2017) (noting that “[i]t is apparent from the literature that there is no single, agreed definition of moral
dumbfounding” but that “an absence of reasons for, or an inability to justify or defend, a moral judgement,
is consistently identified across definitions”).
207 Jonathan Haidt, Fredrik Björklund & Scott Murphy, Moral Dumbfounding: When Intuition Finds
No Reason 1 (Aug. 10, 2000) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with journal).
208 See, e.g., id. at 5–6 (describing various moral-dumbfounding studies); McHugh et al., supra note
206, at 1.
209 Haidt et al., supra note 207, at 18.
210 Id. at 11–12; see also McHugh et al., supra note 206, at 5–6 (describing the Haidt et al. vignettes).
211 See Haidt et al., supra note 207, at 11.
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make them do or say something is strange and unusual. Research by
Professors Kurt Gray and Jonathan Keeney has shown that people view
morally questionable acts as more morally wrongful and as indicative of
worse character if the person performing them engages in weird but morally
irrelevant conduct (in this study, painting themselves red and putting on a
hair cape).212 Whether it is morally acceptable to make a deepfake
pornographic video of a friend, or a deepfake biopic of a scientist, it is
certainly uncommon. Put another way, “who does that?”
Both moral dumbfounding and this weirdness effect are part of a
general literature in moral-psychology research that links moral judgment to
perceptions of harm and feelings of disgust.213 Within this literature, there are
two general sorts of theories of how disgust, harm, and moral judgment are
linked. Professors Jonathan Haidt and Matthew A. Hersh’s direct disgust
model, which grows out of work on moral dumbfounding, suggests that
“[m]oral judgment (at least in the domain of sexual morality) is better
predicted by affective reactions than by informational assumptions about
harm.”214 These “affective reactions such as disgust and discomfort . . . are
later cloaked by harm-based rationalizations.”215 Under this approach,
anything that makes people uncomfortable will come to be viewed as wrong,
and people will then generate theories of harm to justify their reactions post
hoc. The theories of harm are, therefore, somewhat inconsequential; what
actually matters is the initial gut reaction.
A competing theory—the theory of dyadic morality—takes the theories
of harm far more seriously. Psychologists Chelsea Schein and Kurt Gray
suggest two principles that explain moral judgment: “what seems harmful
seems wrong” and “what seems wrong seems harmful.”216 Schein and Gray
suggest that these two principles interact to create a dyadic feedback loop,
amplifying the perceived harmfulness and wrongfulness of certain issues.217
Rather than theories of harm being irrelevant justifications for visceral
reactions, under this approach, they play a substantial independent role. That
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Kurt Gray & Jonathan E. Keeney, Impure or Just Weird? Scenario Sampling Bias Raises
Questions About the Foundation of Morality, 6 SOC. PSYCH. & PERSONALITY SCI. 859, 864–65 (2015).
213 For a discussion on the background of moral psychology research, see Chelsea Schein, Ryan S.
Ritter & Kurt Gray, Harm Mediates the Disgust-Immorality Link, 16 EMOTION 862, 862–63 (2016).
214 Jonathan Haidt & Matthew A. Hersh, Sexual Morality: The Cultures and Emotions of
Conservatives and Liberals, 31 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCH. 191, 213 (2001).
215 Id. at 212 (citation omitted).
216 Chelsea Schein & Kurt Gray, Moralization and Harmification: The Dyadic Loop Explains How
the Innocuous Becomes Harmful and Wrong, 27 PSYCH. INQUIRY 62, 62 (2016).
217 Id. (“This feedback loop has the power to amplify the perceived levels of both harm and
immorality: what seems harmful seems wrong, and what seems wrong seems more harmful, and what
seems more harmful becomes more wrong, and so on.”).
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which feels disgusting will initially be viewed as wrongful, but this feeling
may either deepen or depart depending on whether the person can construct
a theory of harm to justify their initial reaction. Similarly, that which appears
initially harmful may come to be seen as disgusting.
This feedback cycle may further help explain our survey results. Survey
respondents clearly viewed deepfake videos as harmful, which may have led
them to view the behavior as blameworthy. The dyadic framework suggests
that if individuals have an “inkling of an intuition of harm” in a given
context, they will view it as “somewhat immoral,” which will then cause
them to perceive more harm,218 which might culminate in “deepening moral
judgments.”219 The harm perceived in the more blatantly harmful deepfake
videos may therefore have “deepen[ed] and expand[ed] to related
concepts,”220 such as the less blatantly harmful deepfake videos. In short,
participants may have been so persuaded by the generally problematic nature
of deepfakes that they neglected to fully discount their feelings of disgust in
the presence of consent.
2. Scope of Consent and Feminist Legal Scholarship
There are also philosophical arguments that support viewing even
consensual deepfakes as harmful. Here it is helpful to consider the
perspective of antipornography feminism. Traditionally, antipornography
feminists have condemned pornography based on its perceived harmful
impact on women. Professor A. W. Eaton describes this “harm hypothesis”
of antipornography feminist theory, noting that traditional antipornography
feminism connects pornography to harm through both the production and the
postproduction of pornography.221 Essentially, this “harm hypothesis”
concludes that “by harnessing representations of women’s subordination to
a ubiquitous and weighty pleasure, pornography is especially effective at
getting its audience to internalize its inegalitarian views.”222
Deepfakes often depict pornography, and although the product does not
subject the depicted woman to physical exploitation in the same way that
making live pornography might, the final product still depicts a woman’s
likeness. Recall that the scenarios in the study were intentionally written to
reflect the current trends in pornographic deepfakes: men created the videos,
and in the pornographic-deepfake context, all of the videos created were of
women. Even when the woman has consented, the survey respondents might
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be uncomfortable with another having control over a woman’s likeness to
create sexualized depictions. This would be consistent with prior scholarship
that critiques the genuineness of consent in a patriarchal society.223 It also
reflects a potential view that the protagonist should not have even wanted to
produce the video.
One need not accept this particular brand of feminist critique to have
concerns about the consent depicted in these deepfake scenarios. As we
mentioned in Part II, it might not have been clear to the survey respondents
that the people consenting to deepfake creation were making a free and
informed choice. The scenarios are silent on whether the participant
consented to the specific contents of the videos or even knew how deepfakes
worked. One could easily imagine a participant having genuine concerns that
the allegedly consenting party did not know to what they were agreeing.
Also, given the high harmfulness scores for pornographic deepfakes, survey
respondents might be concerned with the postproduction consequences of
the deepfakes. Neither the deepfake subject nor the deepfake creator has full
control over the distribution of a video once it has been publicly posted.
Indeed, scholars have raised a similar concern about the genuineness of
consent in the privacy context more generally. Professor Daniel Solove, for
example, notes that although consent is at the core of privacy selfmanagement, individuals often do not meaningfully consent to the
collection, use, and disclosure of their data due to flawed decision-making
and structural problems, such as the vast number of entities collecting data
and the unanticipated impacts of aggregated data.224 Survey respondents may
hold similar concerns about deepfakes. The consent-skeptical responses of
survey respondents are therefore not entirely unreasonable, even if we would
be slow to endorse them as a policy matter.
Notably, one existing deepfake statute already contains provisions
responsive to a consent-skeptical view. The recently passed New York
deepfake statute says that a person may only consent to the creation or
dissemination of pornographic deepfake “by knowingly and voluntarily
signing an agreement written in plain language that includes a general
description of the sexually explicit material and the audiovisual work in
which it will be incorporated.”225 This consent process is more detailed than
223 See, e.g., Morrison Torrey, Feminist Legal Scholarship on Rape: A Maturing Look at One Form
of Violence Against Women, 2 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 35, 41 (1995) (“In general, feminist critiques
of the legal definition of consent to sexual activity fall into three categories: (1) true consent is not possible
until women are no longer subordinated by men; (2) consent is often presumed or implied in non-stranger
rape; and (3) prevalent sexual mythology encourages men to disbelieve women when they say ‘no.’”).
224 Daniel J. Solove, Privacy Self-Management and the Consent Dilemma, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1880,
1880–82 (2013).
225 N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 52-c(3)(a)–(b) (McKinney 2021).
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that in our scenarios and would result in more thorough notice to the
deepfake subject.
B. Deepfakes and the First Amendment
Because current law often does not vindicate the privacy interests
identified by our subjects⎯except to a degree in states like California and
New York⎯it is important to consider whether an expansion of current law
could do so. The most substantial area where our subjects would wish to
grant new protection is in the context of labeled pornographic deepfakes. We
analyze existing First Amendment doctrine in the context of falsity,
nonconsensual pornography, and morphed child pornography to understand
how courts might approach expanded deepfake laws that seek to give
protection in this area.
1. The Current First Amendment Framework
The Supreme Court has defined categories of speech that fall outside
First Amendment protection—speech “likely[] to incite imminent lawless
action,” obscenity, defamation, “speech integral to criminal conduct,”
fighting words, child pornography, fraud, threats, and “speech presenting
some grave and imminent threat the government has the power to prevent.”226
Deepfake videos as a whole do not fall within these categories, although
specific deepfake videos can depict content that does. So, the fact that a video
is a deepfake does not make it obscene, but a deepfake might depict
obscenity. Because of this, any statute that bans deepfake videos outside
these categories will likely have to be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling
state interest to withstand strict scrutiny.227
Against this backdrop, banning deepfake videos will not be without
challenges. Deepfake videos cannot be banned merely because they are false
in nature. In United States v. Alvarez, the Supreme Court struck down the
Stolen Valor Act, which made it a crime to make false statements about
receiving military decorations or medals.228 The Court reasoned that it had
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United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 717 (2012).
See, e.g., Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155, 163−64 (2015) (noting that laws which “cannot
be ‘justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech’” must face strict scrutiny (quoting
Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989))).
228 Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 715. The relevant part of the Act read:
227

“Whoever falsely represents himself or herself, verbally or in writing, to have been awarded any
decoration or medal authorized by Congress for the Armed Forces of the United States . . . shall
be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than six months, or both. . . . If a decoration or
medal involved in an offense under subsection (a) or (b) is a Congressional Medal of Honor . . .
the offender shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than 1 year, or both.”
Id. at 715−16 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 704(b)–(c)).
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never held that falsity alone was outside First Amendment protection.229
Rather, false statements fall outside First Amendment protection when there
are additional considerations, such as “some other legally cognizable harm
associated with [the] false statement”230 or “[w]here false claims are made to
effect a fraud or secure moneys or other valuable considerations, say, offers
of employment.”231
In the deepfake context, Alvarez would prohibit an outright ban on all
deepfake videos and also a ban on deepfake videos that have no cognizable
harms associated with them. Notably, the participants in the study wanted to
criminalize unlabeled attitudinal deepfakes, but under Alvarez, unlabeled
attitudinal deepfakes cannot be prohibited for merely promoting
falsehoods.232 For example, a deepfake of a politician singing a silly song
could not be prohibited unless there was some problem with it beyond mere
falsity.233 Survey respondents seemed to associate all deepfake videos with
harm, rating both labeled and unlabeled deepfakes as incredibly harmful and
indicating a belief that both labeled and unlabeled deepfakes could interfere
with the subject’s employment prospects, cause emotional and reputational
harm, and, where applicable, interfere with the subject’s election chances.
However, regulations on deepfake videos can likely not be this expansive.234
The kind of election-proximity protection offered to candidates in California
and Texas may be constitutional based on prior case law that limits

229 Id. at 719 (“The Court has never endorsed the categorical rule the Government advances: that
false statements receive no First Amendment protection. . . . Even when considering some instances of
defamation and fraud, moreover, the Court has been careful to instruct that falsity alone may not suffice
to bring the speech outside the First Amendment. The statement must be a knowing or reckless
falsehood.”).
230 Id.
231 Id. at 723.
232 See id. (“Were the Court to hold that the interest in truthful discourse alone is sufficient to sustain
a ban on speech, absent any evidence that the speech was used to gain a material advantage, it would give
government a broad censorial power unprecedented in this Court’s cases or in our constitutional
tradition.”).
233 See id. at 721 (noting that “[s]tatutes that prohibit falsely representing that one is speaking on
behalf of the Government, or that prohibit impersonating a Government officer, also protect the integrity
of Government processes, quite apart from merely restricting false speech”).
234 Deepfakes cannot be banned merely because they depict upsetting content. See, e.g., Snyder v.
Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 458 (2011) (holding speech on a matter of public concern “cannot be restricted
simply because it is upsetting or arouses contempt”); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989) (“If
there is a bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit
the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable.”); Hustler
Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 50 (1988) (declining to hold that “a State’s interest in protecting
public figures from emotional distress is sufficient to deny First Amendment protection to speech that is
patently offensive and is intended to inflict emotional injury, even when that speech could not reasonably
have been interpreted as stating actual facts about the public figure involved”).
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electioneering near polling places,235 but that would provide far more
narrowly tailored protection than most participants are seeking.
One type of falsity-related deepfake regulation that is on firmer
constitutional ground is a labeling requirement for any deepfake video that
is defamatory in nature. Since participants were somewhat less concerned
about labeled deepfakes in the nonpornographic context, such a policy would
be consistent with public views. Given that defamation is one of the
categories excluded from First Amendment protection, this would likely
survive scrutiny. Though such videos would violate existing defamation
law—arguably making such a provision superfluous—the added emotional
impact of a defamatory deepfake video may be reason to grant enhanced
protection against deepfake defamation.
2. Nonconsensual Pornography
Though a labeling requirement might deal with some of the harms from
attitudinal deepfakes, our study shows that the harm of pornographic
deepfakes is unmitigated by such an intervention. Further, participants in our
final study treated deepfake pornography as on par with traditional
nonconsensual pornography, which is already widely prohibited. These
findings raise the question of whether it is possible to ban even labeled
nonconsensual pornographic deepfakes. No court has directly addressed this
issue, but there is parallel case law on nonconsensual pornography and
doctored videos that depict child pornography. Based on this case law and
the survey responses, we believe there is a strong case for viewing the
regulation of deepfake pornography as a compelling state interest.
Nonconsensual pornography, sometimes called revenge pornography,
refers to sexually graphic images and videos that are generally made with
consent by the depicted subjects and then nonconsensually made public.236
Unlike deepfake pornography, nonconsensual pornography is not altered and
depicts no falsity. As of November 2021, forty-eight jurisdictions have
criminalized nonconsensual pornography,237 and those statutes have been
challenged in state courts on First Amendment grounds in seven states.238
The highest courts of only four states, those in Vermont (State v. VanBuren),
235 Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 207–08 (1992) (upholding a law creating a campaign-free zone
within 100 feet of the entrance to a polling place).
236 Citron, supra note 6, at 1917–18.
237 Sales & Magaldi, supra note 113, at 1500; 48 States + DC + One Territory Now Have Revenge
Porn Laws, CYBER C.R. INITIATIVE, https://www.cybercivilrights.org/revenge-porn-laws/ [https://perma.
cc/C5EH-GK5W].
238 Nonconsensual-pornography statutes have been challenged in Arizona, Texas, Wisconsin,
Vermont, Illinois, Indiana, and Minnesota. See Sales & Magaldi, supra note 113, at 1533−34; State v.
Casillas, 952 N.W.2d 629, 634 (Minn. 2020); Order Dismissing Charging Information, ¶¶ 12, 28, Indiana
v. Katz, No. 76C01-2005-CM-000421 (Ind. Cir. Ct. Oct. 2, 2020).
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Illinois (People v. Austen), Minnesota (State v. Casillas), and Texas (Ex
parte Jones), have reviewed the constitutionality of their respective state’s
nonconsensual pornography statutes.239
Although much of the First Amendment analysis in these cases focuses
on the language of the statutes, all of the state supreme courts specifically
note the harm associated with nonconsensual pornography and find the
state’s interest in protecting victims of nonconsensual pornography
compelling, substantial, or important.240 The opinions variously cited
privacy, reputational, and psychological harms; the perpetration of domestic
violence; and the subsequent harassment and threats victims experience after
the dissemination of the images or videos.241 For example, the Vermont court
wrote that prior U.S. Supreme Court statements suggest that “the government
may regulate speech about purely private matters that implicates privacy and
reputational interests.”242 The courts further acknowledged that victims have
been fired and have difficulty finding employment.243 The Vermont Supreme
Court specifically underscored the emotional and reputational harms of
nonconsensual pornography, stating, “The personal consequences of such
profound personal violation and humiliation generally include, at a
minimum, extreme emotional distress.”244 And the Texas court also
recognized that “[v]ictims of revenge porn cannot counterspeak their way
out of a violation of their most private affairs and bodily autonomy nor the
serious harms that may accompany that violation.”245 It noted that this lack
239 See State v. VanBuren, 214 A.3d 791, 794 (Vt. 2019); People v. Austin, 155 N.E.3d 439, 448 (Ill.
2019); Casillas, 952 N.W.2d at 629; Ex parte Jones, No. PD-0552-18, 2021 WL 2126172, at *1 (Tex.
Crim. App. May 26, 2021), reh’g denied, (July 28, 2021). The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals is Texas’s
highest court. It did not publish its decision in this case, possibly because the statute had since been
materially amended.
240 See VanBuren, 214 A.3d at 810−11; Austin, 155 N.E.3d at 461−62; Casillas, 952 N.W.2d at 641–
42; Jones, 2021 WL 2126172, at *7 (“We agree with the State that the privacy interest in the statute is a
compelling government interest . . . [and] particularly, the interest in sexual privacy is substantial.”). A
lower court in Wisconsin also used similar language. State v. Culver, 918 N.W.2d 103, 110 (Wis. Ct.
App. 2018) (“In prohibiting the knowing publication of intentionally private depictions of another person
who is either nude, partially nude, or engaged in sexually explicit conduct, the statute serves to protect an
important state interest—individual privacy. No one can challenge a state’s interest in protecting the
privacy of personal images of one’s body that are intended to be private—and specifically, protecting
individuals from the nonconsensual publication on websites accessible by the public.”).
241 See VanBuren, 214 A.3d at 810−11 (privacy, reputational, and psychological harm; harassment;
threats of violence); Austin, 155 N.E.3d at 461−62 (psychological harm; threats of violence; harassment;
facilitation of domestic violence, human trafficking, and sexual assault); Casillas, 952 N.W.2d at 641–
42 (privacy, psychological, and reputational harm); Jones, 2021 WL 2126172, at *7 (privacy,
reputational, and psychological harm; harassment).
242 VanBuren, 214 A.3d at 802.
243 See id. at 810−11; Austin, 155 N.E.3d at 461.
244 VanBuren, 214 A.3d at 810.
245 Jones, 2021 WL 2126172, at *7.
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of a counterspeech remedy makes nonconsensual pornography different than
other categories of harmful expression.246
There are substantial similarities between the privacy-related harms
contained within deepfake pornography and nonconsensual pornography. As
with nonconsensual pornography, victims of deepfake pornography report
various harms, including harassment and threats.247 The survey responses are
also consistent with the notion that deepfake pornography, both labeled and
unlabeled, is extremely harmful and an affront to the dignity of the person
depicted. In VanBuren, the court relied heavily on prior case law that
determined the state has a compelling interest in the regulation of purely
private matters such as intimate images of a person.248 The court in Austin
relied on a similar privacy rationale, at times borrowing from VanBuren.249
Deepfake pornography, like nonconsensual pornography generally, concerns
the dignitary privacy one has over her likeness. Nonconsensual pornography
and deepfake pornography both involve a type of dignitary harm that stems
from one’s ability to control information about oneself.250 Nonconsensual
pornography involves disclosure of personal information, which “can
severely inhibit a person’s autonomy and self-development.”251 Deepfake
pornography creates similar harm as a “distortion” that manipulates “the way
a person is perceived and judged by others, and involves the victim being
inaccurately exposed to the public.”252 Much like the painful accuracy of
nonconsensually disclosed pornography, the misrepresentation of deepfake
pornography impacts one’s ability to control their sexual identity.253 As noted
by the court in VanBuren, “In the constellation of privacy interests, it is
difficult to imagine something more private than images depicting an
individual engaging in sexual conduct . . . .”254
246 Id. at *7 n.79 (suggesting that counterspeech may serve “as a remedy for lies and ‘speech we do
not like’” (quoting United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 726–28 (2012))).
247 See, e.g., Citron, supra note 6, at 1921–23 (describing a female journalist targeted on social media
with sexual violence accompanied with attitudinal and pornographic deepfake videos); Harwell, supra
note 74 (describing pornographic deepfake videos as being “weaponized disproportionately against
women, representing a new and degrading means of humiliation, harassment, and abuse”).
248 See VanBuren, 214 A.3d at 808 (“Time and again, the Supreme Court has recognized that speech
concerning purely private matters does not carry as much weight in the strict-scrutiny analysis as speech
concerning matters of public concern, and may accordingly be subject to more expansive regulation.”).
249 See Austin, 155 N.E.3d at 460–62.
250 See ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 7 (1967) (“Privacy is the claim of individuals,
groups, or institutions to determine for themselves when, how, and to what extent information about them
is communicated to others.”).
251 Daniel J. Solove, The Virtues of Knowing Less: Justifying Privacy Protections Against
Disclosure, 53 DUKE L.J. 967, 991 (2003).
252 Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 477, 547 (2006).
253 See Citron, supra note 6, at 1921.
254 State v. VanBuren, 214 A.3d 791, 810 (Vt. 2019).
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Though each of the four states to rule on these statutes has upheld them,
the constitutionality of nonconsensual-pornography laws is disputed.255 To
the extent nonconsensual pornography can be criminalized, however, it
follows that deepfake pornography can also be criminalized. Our participants
appear to have viewed pornographic deepfakes as a dignitary violation rather
than as a defamatory message because they were not substantially reassured
by the prospect that the videos could be labeled as fake. This finding makes
us comfortable categorizing pornographic deepfakes as speech that
implicates sexual privacy, the protection of which has consistently been
considered a substantial or compelling government interest.256
3. Morphed Pornography
The question of whether deepfake pornographic videos are effectively
the same as real pornographic videos has arisen before in the context of child
pornography. Child pornography law differentiates between virtual child
pornography, which does not depict actual children, and morphed child
pornography, which inserts the face of a real child onto the body of an adult
in a pornographic picture or video. These are, effectively, deepfakes before
deepfakes. Fully virtual child pornography cannot be criminalized under the
Supreme Court’s decision Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition,257 but that case
specifically left open the question of morphed child pornography.258
All circuits addressing the question of morphed child pornography have
held that it is permissible to criminalize morphed pornography that uses the
face of a real child.259 The Fifth Circuit case was the most recent. In agreeing
with the Second and Sixth Circuits that morphed child pornography is not
255 See, e.g., Andrew Koppelman, Revenge Pornography and First Amendment Exceptions,
65 EMORY L.J. 661, 662 (2016) (“The constitutionality of [revenge-porn] laws is uncertain . . . .”); John
A. Humbach, The Constitution and Revenge Porn, 35 PACE L. REV. 215, 260 (2014) (“It appears that
most of the revenge-porn laws recently proposed and enacted, which simply punish sexually-themed
images disseminated without consent of persons depicted, are unconstitutional . . . .”).
256 See VanBuren, 214 A.3d at 811; People v. Austin, 155 N.E.3d 439, 462 (Ill. 2019); People v.
Iniguez, 202 Cal. Rptr. 3d 237, 243 (2016).
257 535 U.S. 234, 256 (2002). More specifically, it cannot be criminalized under the child
pornography exception to the First Amendment. It may be possible to criminalize it as obscenity.
258 See id. at 242.
259 See Doe v. Boland, 698 F.3d 877, 880 (6th Cir. 2012) (“Morphed images are of a piece [with
traditional pornography], offering a difference in degree of injury but not in kind.”); United States v.
Mecham, 950 F.3d 257, 260 (5th Cir. 2020), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 139; United States v. Hotaling,
634 F.3d 725, 730 (2d Cir. 2011) (“[H]ere we have six identifiable minor females who were at risk of
reputational harm and suffered the psychological harm of knowing that their images were exploited and
prepared for distribution by a trusted adult.”); United States v. Anderson, 759 F.3d 891, 895−96 (8th Cir.
2014) (“Although subjects of morphed images . . . do not suffer the direct physical and psychological
effects of sexual abuse that accompany the production of traditional child pornography, the morphed
images’ ‘continued existence causes the child victims continuing harm by haunting the children in years
to come.’” (quoting Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 111 (1990))).
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protected speech, the court noted, “By using identifiable images of real
children, these courts conclude, morphed child pornography implicates the
reputational and emotional harm to children that has long been a justification
for excluding real child pornography from the First Amendment.”260 In
effect, fake child pornography that appears to feature a real child can be
criminalized for a subset of the same reasons that real child pornography
featuring that child can be criminalized.
It is tempting to directly apply the same rationale to nonconsensual
adult pornography and nonconsensual adult deepfake pornography. In each
case, the fact that the video is morphed rather than genuine fails to prevent
the harm to dignity and the risk of concrete consequences to employment.
Historically, however, child pornography has been treated differently than
adult pornography. In New York v. Ferber, the Supreme Court upheld a ban
on child pornography, holding that the state has a compelling interest in the
well-being of minors and that child pornography relates to the sexual abuse
of children in two ways.261 “First, the materials produced are a permanent
record of the children’s participation and the harm to the child is exacerbated
by their circulation.”262 Second, to combat the sexual exploitation necessarily
involved in the production of child pornography, the distribution networks
must be closed.263 Almost a decade later, the Court upheld an Ohio statute
banning the possession and viewing of child pornography.264 There, the Court
reasoned that the statute encouraged the destruction of child pornography,
which otherwise creates a permanent recording of child victims and their
abuse and is used to coerce children into engaging in sexual conduct.265
The protection of children, therefore, is an especially compelling state
interest. Courts may be less willing to grant expansive protection against
abuses perpetrated on adults with morphed images and videos than they are
in the case of children because, historically, courts have “sustained
legislation aimed at protecting the physical and emotional well-being of
youth even when the laws have operated in the sensitive area of
constitutionally protected rights.”266 This means that courts could justifiably
distinguish here between the importance of morphing in the child and adult
contexts. Recall that the Ashcroft Court extended protection to fully virtual
260

Mecham, 950 F.3d at 265.
458 U.S. 747, 759 (1982).
262 Id. at 759.
263 Id.
264 Osborne, 495 U.S. at 111.
265 Id.
266 Ferber, 458 U.S. at 757. It is a little unclear how this interest in protecting children works in the
case of morphed images. If the picture was taken at age ten and the subject is now thirty, should they still
get the enhanced protection due children?
261
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child pornography in part because it did not require harming real children to
make it.267 One could imagine a court using similar language regarding
deepfake pornography of adults.
Nevertheless, the reputational and emotional harms credited by courts
in the context of morphed child pornography are similar to those reported by
adults depicted in nonconsensual deepfake pornography. Indeed, our survey
respondents acknowledged that those depicted in pornographic deepfakes
would experience such harm. The results of our studies, therefore, reinforce
the logic of the morphed child pornography cases and their application to
deepfake adult pornography.
CONCLUSION
If a person has a supply of good pictures of a target, they can make a
video of that target saying or doing almost anything. This revolution in
video-morphing technology has caused deepfake videos to explode in
prevalence over the last several years. Our studies show that there is a strong
moral consensus that the creation of nonconsensual deepfakes is wrongful
and causes extensive harm. Further, the studies show that pornographic
deepfake videos⎯which are the majority of deepfake videos on the
internet⎯are considered especially harmful. Though the public has divided
views about some attitudinal deepfakes, even sexualized videos lacking
nudity were almost universally condemned.
Labeling a deepfake as fake mitigates the harm for attitudinal deepfakes
but not for pornographic deepfakes. Though there are sharp constitutional
limits on whether it is possible to prohibit the creation of labeled attitudinal
deepfakes, it is likely possible to prohibit the creation of pornographic
deepfakes given the existing First Amendment case law on nonconsensual
pornography. The public attitudes captured here provide strong support for
doing so and should be taken seriously by courts and policymakers grappling
with this new technology.
The case of deepfake technology further points to an emerging problem
in the privacy landscape. Privacy in this context is about dignity, autonomy,
and identity expression—about people losing control of their public
identities. To appropriately understand the dangers associated with
deepfakes and the unauthorized use of one’s likeness, courts and
policymakers must take seriously the kinds of dignitary harms associated
with these new kinds of privacy invasions.
267 See Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 236 (2002) (“Ferber’s judgment about child
pornography was based upon how it was made, not on what it communicated. The case reaffirmed that
where the speech is neither obscene nor the product of sexual abuse, it does not fall outside the First
Amendment’s protection.”).
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APPENDIX A: DEMOGRAPHICS OF THE SAMPLES
The sample for Study 1 was recruited by Dynata. The samples for
Studies 2 and 3, reported in Sections II.D and II.E, respectively, were
recruited by CloudResearch.
TABLE A1: DEMOGRAPHIC DATA FOR EACH SURVEY
Study 1

Study 2

Study 3

Census268

Gender
Female
52.1%
50.9%
55.2%
50.8%
Male
47.9%
49.1%
44.4%
49.2%
Other
0.0%
0.0%
0.5%
Age (Years)
Median
48
47
45269
Mean
47.81 (17.50) 49.18 (15.55) 44.81 (15.80)
Political Orientation (1–7)270
4.12 (1.80)
4.10 (1.79)
3.97 (1.78)
Race and Ethnicity
White
79.1%
84.1%
76.5%
76.3%
Black or African American
11.1%
9.6%
16.1%
13.4%
American Indian or Native American
0.7%
1.3%
1.4%
1.3%
Asian American
5.6%
4.1%
1.2%
5.9%
Hawaiian or Pacific Islander
0.3%
0.0%
1.9%
0.2%
Multiracial or Other
3.2%
1.1%
2.9%
2.8%
Hispanic (of Any Race)
16.0%
8.1%
10.6%
18.5%
Educational Attainment
Less Than High School Diploma
7.8%
1.8%
4.3%
10.9%
High School Diploma or GED
31.2%
18.7%
30.9%
28.6%
Two-Year or Some College
28.8%
38.2%
38.1%
28.2%
Four-Year College
20.8%
25.1%
18.9%
20.6%
Graduate Degree
11.4%
16.2%
7.7%
11.6%
Note. For age and political orientation: means (standard deviations in parentheses). Hispanic identity was
assessed in a separate question than racial identity.

268 Ethnicity and gender statistics are from the U.S. Census website. See QuickFacts, U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/quickfacts//fact//table//US//PST045217 [https://perma.cc/S5BR9P3J]. Educational attainment was calculated from data in table 1 in Educational Attainment in the United
States: 2018, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Apr. 17, 2020), https://www.census.gov/data/tables/2018/demo/
education-attainment/cps-detailed-tables.html [https://perma.cc/Q458-PS5U].
269 Two participants in Study 3 entered what appears to have been their birth year. Their ages were
estimated based off that information. One participant entered an out-of-range number, so their response
to the age question was disregarded.
270 Political orientation was assessed on a scale ranging from 1, very liberal, to 7, very conservative.
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APPENDIX B: UNLABELED VARIANTS OF ALL SCENARIOS FROM
PRIMARY STUDY
These are the unlabeled scenario variants used in the studies. The
labeled variants were adapted from these by replacing the final sentences as
described on page 637.
A. Pornographic Scenarios
Written Pornographic Story, Friend
Imagine Jane is a friend of Will. Will has written a story about Jane. In
Will’s story, he describes what Jane really looks like and depicts her having
graphic sex with a man. The story is very detailed. Will posts his story online
publicly, and he includes Jane’s first and last name. Though this story is
made up, a reader cannot easily tell. Will does not indicate that it is fake
when he posts it.
Deepfake Pornographic Video, Friend
Imagine Jane is a friend of Will. Will finds a series of photos of Jane
online. Will takes the photos and uses an app to merge her face onto a
pornographic video. The final video shows Jane’s face on the body of a
naked woman having sex with a man. The video shows the entirety of the
naked woman’s body. Jane’s face is clearly identifiable in the video. Will
posts the video online publicly, and he includes Jane’s first and last name.
Though this video is made up, a viewer cannot easily tell that it has been
altered. Will does not indicate that it is fake when he posts it.
Deepfake Pornographic Video, Celebrity
Imagine Will finds a series of photos of a famous female celebrity
online. Will finds a series of photos of the celebrity online. Will takes the
photos and uses an app to merge her face onto a pornographic video. The
final video shows the celebrity’s face on the body of a naked woman having
sex with a man. The video shows the entirety of the naked woman’s body.
The celebrity’s face is clearly identifiable in the video. Will posts the video
online publicly, and he includes the celebrity’s first and last name. Though
this video is made up, a viewer cannot easily tell that it has been altered. Will
does not indicate that it is fake when he posts it.
Deepfake Pornographic Video, Sexualized Voice
Imagine Jane is a friend of Will. Will finds a series of photos of Jane
online. Will takes the photos and uses an app to merge her face onto a video.
The final video shows Jane’s face on the body of a woman who is wearing
revealing clothing. The woman is not nude. The video depicts Jane speaking
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seductively about having sex. Jane’s face is clearly identifiable in the video.
Will has also used software to simulate Jane’s voice, so the voice in the video
sounds exactly like Jane’s real voice. Will posts the video online publicly,
and he includes Jane’s first and last name. Though this video is made up, a
viewer cannot easily tell that it has been altered. Will does not indicate that
it is fake when he posts it.
Deepfake Pornographic Video, No Nudity, BDSM
Imagine Jane is a friend of Will. Will finds a series of photos of Jane
online. Will takes the photos and uses an app to merge her face onto a video.
The final video shows Jane’s face on the body of a woman who is spanking
a man. The woman is dressed in a revealing leather outfit. Jane’s face is
clearly identifiable in the video. Will posts the video online publicly, and he
includes Jane’s first and last name. Though this video is made up, a viewer
cannot easily tell that it has been altered. Will does not indicate that it is fake
when he posts it.
Deepfake Pornographic Video, Personal Use, No Consent
Imagine Jenny is a friend of Will. Will has created a video of Jenny.
Will finds a series of photos of Jenny online. Will takes the photos and uses
an app to merge her face onto a pornographic video. The final video shows
Jenny’s face on the body of a naked woman having sex with a man. The
video shows the entirety of the nude woman’s body. Jenny’s face is clearly
identifiable in the video. Though this video is made up, a viewer cannot
easily tell that it has been altered. Will keeps the video for himself and never
shares it with anyone.
Deepfake Pornographic Video, Personal Use, Consent
Imagine Jenny is a friend of Will. Will asks Jenny if he can edit her face
into a pornographic video that he will not show to anyone else. Jenny says
yes. Will finds a series of photos of Jenny online. Will takes the photos and
uses an app to merge her face onto a pornographic video. The final video
shows Jenny’s face on the body of a naked woman having sex with a man.
The video shows the entirety of the nude woman’s body. Jenny’s face is
clearly identifiable in the video. Though this video is made up, a viewer
cannot easily tell that it has been altered. Will keeps the video for himself
and never shares it with anyone.
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B. Private Attitudinal Scenarios
Written Cocaine-Use Story
Imagine Jane is a friend of Will. Will has written a story about Jane. In
Will’s story, he describes what Jane really looks like and depicts Jane using
cocaine. The story is very detailed. Will posts his story online publicly, and
he includes Jane’s first and last name. Though this story is made up, a reader
cannot easily tell. Will does not indicate that it is fake when he posts it.
Deepfake Cocaine-Use Video
Imagine Jane is a friend of Will. Will finds a series of photos of Jane
online. Will takes the photos and uses an app to merge Jane’s face onto a
video of someone else. The final video shows Jane’s face on the body of a
woman who is using cocaine. Jane’s face is clearly identifiable in the video.
Will decides to post the video online, and he includes Jane’s first and last
name. Though this video is made up, a viewer cannot easily tell that it has
been altered. Will does not indicate that it is fake when he posts it.
Deepfake Self-Insult
Imagine Jane is a friend of Will. Will finds a series of photos of Jane
online. Will takes the photos and uses an app to merge Jane’s face onto a
video of someone else. The final video depicts Jane calling herself a jerk.
Jane’s face is clearly identifiable in the video. Will has also used software to
simulate Jane’s voice, so the voice in the video sounds exactly like Jane’s
real voice. Will decides to post the video online, and he includes Jane’s first
and last name. Though this video is made up, a viewer cannot easily tell that
it has been altered. Will does not indicate that it is fake when he posts it.
Deepfake Scientist Biography, Dead
Imagine Will runs an enthusiast’s website about science. Will finds a
series of photos of a famous scientist online. The scientist died ten years ago.
Will takes the photos and uses an app to merge the scientist’s face onto a
video of someone else. The final video depicts the scientist talking about
their life and accomplishments. The scientist’s face is clearly identifiable in
the video. Will has also used software to simulate the scientist’s voice, so the
voice in the video sounds exactly like the scientist’s real voice. Will decides
to post the video online, and he includes the scientist’s first and last name.
Though this video is made up, a viewer cannot easily tell that it has been
altered. Will does not indicate that it is fake when he posts it.
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Deepfake Scientist Biography, Living
Imagine Will runs an enthusiast’s website about science. Will finds a
series of photos of a famous scientist online. The scientist has just recently
retired. Will takes the photos and uses an app to merge the scientist’s face
onto a video of someone else. The final video depicts the scientist talking
about their life and accomplishments. The scientist’s face is clearly
identifiable in the video. Will has also used software to simulate the
scientist’s voice, so the voice in the video sounds exactly like the scientist’s
real voice. Will decides to post the video online, and he includes the
scientist’s first and last name. Though this video is made up, a viewer cannot
easily tell that it has been altered. Will does not indicate that it is fake when
he posts it.
C. Politician Attitudinal Scenarios
Written Handshake-with-Child-Molester Story
Imagine Will has written a story about a politician. In Will’s story, he
states that the politician is friends with a convicted child molester. The story
is very detailed. Will posts his story online publicly, and he includes the
politician’s first and last name. Though this story is made up, a reader cannot
easily tell. Will does not indicate that it is fake when he posts it.
Deepfake Handshake-with-Child-Molester Video
Imagine Will finds a series of photos of a politician online. Will takes
the photos and uses an app to merge the politician’s face onto a video of
someone else. The final video shows the politician’s face on the body of a
person who is shaking hands with a convicted child molester. The
politician’s face is clearly identifiable in the video. Will decides to post the
video online, and he includes the politician’s first and last name. Though this
video is made up, a viewer cannot easily tell that it has been altered. Will
does not indicate that it is fake when he posts it.
Deepfake Terror Endorsement
Imagine Will finds a series of photos of a politician online. Will takes
the photos and uses an app to merge the politician’s face onto a video of
someone else. The final video shows the politician saying they support a
known terrorist organization. The politician’s face is clearly identifiable in
the video. Will has also used software to simulate the politician’s voice, so
the voice in the video sounds exactly like the politician’s real voice. Will
decides to post the video online, and he includes the politician’s first and last
name. Though this video is made up, a viewer cannot easily tell that it has
been altered. Will does not indicate that it is fake when he posts it.
678

116:611 (2021)

Deepfake Privacy

Deepfake Silly Song, No Consent
Imagine Will finds a series of photos of a state-level politician online.
Will takes the photos and uses an app to merge the politician’s face onto a
video of someone else. The final video shows the politician singing a silly
song. The politician’s face is clearly identifiable in the video. Will has also
used software to simulate the politician’s voice, so the voice in the video
sounds exactly like the politician’s real voice. Will decides to post the video
online, and he includes the politician’s first and last name. Though this video
is made up, a viewer cannot easily tell that it has been altered. Will does not
indicate that it is fake when he posts it.
Deepfake Silly Song, Consent
Imagine a state-level politician has invited her constituents to make and
share silly videos of her for her campaign. This politician represents Will.
Will finds a series of photos of the politician online. Will takes the photos
and uses an app to merge the politician’s face onto a video of someone else.
The final video shows the politician singing a silly song. The politician’s
face is clearly identifiable in the video. Will has also used software to
simulate the politician’s voice, so the voice in the video sounds exactly like
her real voice. The politician has consented to Will making the video. Will
decides to post the video online, and he includes the politician’s first and last
name. Though this video is made up, a viewer cannot easily tell that it has
been altered. Will does not indicate that it is fake when he posts it.
Deepfake Polling Place, No Consent
Imagine Will finds a series of photos of a politician online. Will takes
the photos and uses an app to merge the politician’s face onto a video of
someone else. The final video shows the politician telling people where their
local polling places are. The politician’s face is clearly identifiable in the
video. Will has also used software to simulate the politician’s voice, so the
voice in the video sounds exactly like the politician’s real voice. Will decides
to post the video online, and he includes the politician’s first and last name.
Though this video is made up, a viewer cannot easily tell that it has been
altered. Will does not indicate that it is fake when he posts it.
Deepfake Polling Place, Consent
Imagine a state-level politician has invited her constituents to make and
share videos of her telling people the location of their local polling place.
This politician represents Will. Will finds a series of photos of the politician
online. Will takes the photos and uses an app to merge the politician’s face
onto a video of someone else. The final video depicts the politician telling
679

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

people where their local polling places are. The politician’s face is clearly
identifiable in the video. Will has also used software to simulate the
politician’s voice, so the voice in the video sounds exactly like her real voice.
The politician has consented to Will making the video. Will decides to post
the video online, and he includes the politician’s first and last name. Though
this video is made up, a viewer cannot easily tell that it has been altered. Will
does not indicate that it is fake when he posts it.
APPENDIX C: VARIANTS CONTRASTING DEEPFAKES WITH TRADITIONAL
NONCONSENSUAL PORNOGRAPHY
The purpose of this study was to compare nonconsensual deepfake
pornography with traditional nonconsensual pornography. The deepfake
video scenario below was therefore modified from that used in the prior
studies to better mirror the newly created traditional nonconsensualpornography scenario.
Deepfake Pornographic Video, Ex-Romantic Partner
Imagine Jane used to date her friend Will. After they break-up, Will
finds a series of photos of Jane online. Will takes the photos and uses an app
to merge her face onto a pornographic video. The final video shows Jane’s
face on the body of a naked woman masturbating. Jane’s face is clearly
identifiable in the video, and the video shows the entirety of the naked
woman’s body. Will posts the video online publicly, and he includes Jane’s
first and last name. Though this video is made up, a viewer cannot easily tell
that it has been altered. Will does not indicate that it is fake when he posts it.
Traditional Nonconsensual Pornography, Ex-Romantic Partner
Imagine Mary used to date her friend James. While they were dating,
Mary sent James a video of herself masturbating. James had asked for the
video and had promised to keep it private. Mary’s face is clearly identifiable
in the video, and the video shows the entirety of her naked body. After they
break-up, James posts the video online publicly, and he includes Mary’s first
and last name.
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